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Since the bombing of Himhima on August 6, 1945, much has 
becn written abut the atomic bomb and nuclear energy. Many of 
the stories have been based on partial infoxmation ; and confusion 
has r d t t d .  This booklet repr#rents an attempt to present tbt 
facts of atomic cnergp and some of their implications. It is a co- 
operative effort on the part of a number of scientists, who par- 
ticipated in the development of the atomic bomb, and who have 
given much thought to the problems raiscd by the dcasc of 
nuclear energy. 
Together with this background there is presented a f d  
picture of the devastation c a d  by the fifst a t d c  bombs, and 
tbe probable e&cts atomic tltpIosivc~ will have on inttmational 
rcfatioaw The cotldusim dram are summarized in discussions- 
of control of a d  energy. 
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1. A h i c  bmnb d h c h  are bighly dedwdve. Present day 
a m i c  mapom might 30% or more of a country's population 
and destroy a major portion of its industry in a single attack lasting 
a few minutes. 
2. Mach m o n  powerful afomic bombs me In prorprct. 
3. No dectiva d h s e  con be rxp.c4d Much of present 
disamion asurn- that atomic bombs d l  be dropped from plants; 
actually, atomic charges can be adaptd for delivcxy in as diverse 
ways as by rockets, robombs, or by mines or time bombs gcnctly 
planted. 
4. D isprw l  of cI+h Is #Ie only d.f.arr tdw so hr a& 
w a d  which Is evm hmpomdly prcrctical. One plan for 
redistributing U. S. population and key industrim has bem =ti- 
mated to cost 300 billion Mars. 
5. No Mg ucn) pmteds +he albmk bomb. Only the United 
States, Great Britain and Canada know details of the prescnt 
engineering prod-, bat other nations m y  be e x m d  to mas- 
ter thcm or develop alwnative pmcedum within a few years. 
Btcause of this, talk of "Laping the secret'' merely breeds suspicion 
in other countrits md false complaoersep in our own. 
L Ail mofor pow- haw accau +o the necessary row 
ma;hrIalr. Uranium, the aitid material, b fairly widely sat- 
tered about the earth. 
7. C O S ~  d b r6) mfbtth*. Ally 
nation which can afford an army or navy can &rd atomic bombs. 
1. Orf-prodwciag the emmy is r d  mu& a d v o h w  In 
abmia warfare. Eve hundred bombs may be better than 100, 
but 50,000 am no better than 5,000 because 5,000 would d-OY 
all important targets in any country. Comuently, a smd, d a -  
tively poor nation might defmt a larger, richer nation by attacking 
fifblt. 
2 Ahmfc bomb s)otkpllw Iitcraclri +ha probability of 
war by creating m amasphere of mutual suspicion among nations. 
They provide additional incentive to d o n  by increasing the 
advantage of surpris~, and by pad& attach in which 
the aggre880r need not rev& bis identity. 
3. kar d raprismls canW bs eolldod on )o pruvmt fie 
use mf afomle weapons. A nation may evacuate its cities prior 
to a d % ,  or even attack anonymously. 
4. Scientists consider that stflclaa+ Insplartion syshms Cr 
i#m Interndona1 controf or mlimtndon of abmfc weap 
om are hcbnfcally faosible. T h e  introduction of such an in- 
spection system is thus primarily a political rather than a technical 
problem. 
5. Tbe *mat of domle warfclre far orfwmigbs ia tm 
podanct +he p a c d m e  k n i t s  of demic power. Mate- 
rials used in a& power pIants could d y  bc converted into 
bomb; therefore, if atomic power pku'its arc permitted, the prob 
lcm of dcvisiig an adcquate control to prevent the manufacture 
of atomic bornbe bceames more dib64t. 

what the Atomic Bomb Daau* 
On Septunbtr 6, Z csmt to Japan to join General Fafrcll's party 
there. . . . 
The reporters and the photographers have made dear for 
us alt the appearance of the wardamaged towm, cspecial1y of the 
uties dcstroycd by the first atomic bombs, Hiroshima and Naga- 
saki. But tbere is more to be learned from those B C ~ ~ C S  than the 
newspapers have yet been able to tell., . . 
Jt is my purpose to tell the Committee as dearly as X can 
what the i p i o n s  of an American physicist are when be views 
ruins and talks to the survivors of the bmnbing he and his 
co-workers spent so much tinat to mkc e b l e .  
The atamic b o d  is not merely a new weapon, it is a revolu- 
tion in war, I saw the blackened ruins of Tokyo and of Osaka, of 
Kobe md of Nagoya, and I know that a citg cannot live under 
the fire raids of a thousand 13-29's. The destruction of a great aty 
is not the new feature of the atomic bomb. T o  make dm why 
the atomic bomb is different one must talk of the B-29. 
We of the h A l m a  project who went overstas in July to 
premrt the l m h  for delivery over the tatgct were stationed on 
the d l  island of Tinian, near Saipan in the Marianas chain. 
Tinian is a miracle. Here, six thousand mile from San Francisco, 
the United States armed forces have built the Isgat  airport in 
the world. A great cord ridge was half-lev& to fill a rough 
plain, and to build six runways, each an cxcdent ~ - 1 m e  highway, 
tach almost two miIm Iong. Beside these runways stmd in Iong 
rows the great silvery airplanes. The~r were there not by the do- 
but by the hundred. From the air this island, smalIer than Man- 
hattan, looked Iikc a giant aircraft mritr, its deck loaded with 
bombers. I have flown in a B-29, and I doubt that there is a more 
complex and wonderful machine of any kind. And here> far frmn 
Seattle or Wichita, were wvtral hundreds of thm millimdollar 
craft. Here were collected tens of thousands of specialists, trainad 
in the operation and repair of the delime mechanisms which eram 
the M y  of the plane. I n  the harbor rode tankers, laden with thou- 
sands of tons of aviation gasoline. A net of pipe Iincs supplied 
the airfields with fuel. The radio did was busy with signals of 
merp Liad. And alI t h e  gigantic prepadom bad a aad 
temble outcane At sunset wme day the fidd would be loud with 
t h e m o f  them~rmr~ownthgreatrunwaysroddnllthc 
hugt p l q  seeming to move dmIy because of their size, h t  far 
outspdng the d o a d  racing jeep. Om a h  another & 
runway would launch its p l a n  Oncc every fifteen ~eeonh another 
E-29 would become air-borne; For an hour and a bdf this muId 
continue with p r d i a n  and order. The sun would go ;b the 
m, and the kt p h  could still be seen in the distance, with 
running lights stiI1 on. Often a plmt w d d  fail to make the take 
off, and go skbming hom'bly into the sea, or into the beach to 
bum like a huge torcb. W e  - often to sit on the ad ridge 
md w a d  the -bat strike of the 313th wing in real am. Mmt 
of the p h  would return rhE n a t  morning standiilg in a single 
line, like beads on mr chain, from just ovc~heaa to the h&n. 
You could sac ten or twelve pImw at a h e ,  s p a d  s couple of 
mila &art. As fast as the near plane muld land, another would 
appclli at the edge of thc sky. Then  wwc almp the same num- 
ber of planes in sight. The cmpty field d d  fill up, d in an 
houx or two all the planes would have landd. 
N e  day the iecormnakna photographs would m c  in. 
They showed r Japanese city, with wh& square miles of it d 1 
and torn by flame. The fire bombs dzvpped on d and paper 
h o w  by the thousands of tons had ddwe their work A thousand 
B-29's t;me and again b u d  many square mitts in a o g e  raid. 
Tbe stoau'c bomb was d i g  &. There were no ahip 
I d  of incendd#i. Instcad of all the ordnance men and their 
bomb dumps there were about tWCtl~-five pcode )rwn h A h m ,  
a few Quonset huts transformed into ttsting hboratorics, and a 
barridad buiIdiag. The gtrikc took off after midnight. The field 
was darted.  Only two or thra plmm were w m h g  up. A few 
Ughw burned around r single hard+&, And one plane m a d  
down the runway, twk o$ and set mume for the citiw of the 
m y .  Tbe m o m a h n e e  photaa next day told the same story. 
One plane, with one bomb, had dmmyd maay marc d a  of a 
city, d~troyed them even mom thorou&ly and with wen 1- 
chance for resismm or escape. 
I a n  tnagine a t h o 4  ato& bombs and an airport like 
T i ' s  to send them ofi. But not even the United St~tes  could 
prepare a thousa~d Tiniaas with ordinary bombs. There are sim- 
ply not enough pmpk Destruction has changed qualitatively with 
this new catrgy. War ean now datroy not cities, but nations. 
There is even more to be said. I remember vividly the lunch 
we hsd at the prcprcftctud building in Hiroshima. The Japan= 
&& came there to tali: to us and to describe their experitnca. 
I spoke to the chief medical officer of the district. He bad been 
pinned in the & of his house for stveral dags after the 
explosi-he lived a little more than a mile from the point of 
i m p a c t e d  was still wearing splints. His assistant had been 
killed, and his assistant's assistant. Of the three hundred registered 
physicians, more tbaa two hundred and &ty were unaMe to aid 
the injured. Of twcn+four hundred nu-, orderlim, and first 
aid workers, more than eighteen hundred were made casualtics in 
a single instant. It was the same everywhere. There were about 
thirty-three modern fire stations in Himhima. Twenty-six were 
uxltss after the blast, and three-quarters of the firemen killed or 
missing. The military organization was destroyed; the command- 
ing merd and d his staff werc kilIcd, with some five thousand 
of the garrison bf tight thousand. Not one hospital in tht city was 
left in condition to shelter patients fram the rain. The p m r  and 
telephone were both out over the whole etntxd region of the city. 
Debris Bled the stmts, and hundreds, even thousands of fim 
b u r d  unchcckcd among the injured and the dead. No one was 
able to fight than. 
There is a word for tbi kind of attack; it is described as an 
attack of saturation. If you strike at a man or a dty, pour adver- 
sary protects W f .  If you attack a man, he runs or strikes b& 
at you; if you attack a city, it t h m  up flak, it musters its fire- 
men, it treats the wounded, But if you strike all at once with 
ovemhelming ha, your enemy annot protect h i i f .  He is 
stunned. The flak bat&- arc all shooting as fast as they can; 
the firemen arc aU busy throwing water at the h a .  Then your 
strike may grow lariger without i n d  mistance. The defenses 
are satmad. The atomic bomb is a weapon of saturation. It 
dcgtrop so quickly and MI comp1ebtIy such a h g c  arca that defense 
i s  hoptlas. Leademhip and orpnktion are gone. Key personnel 
arc LilId, With the fire stations m d e d  and thc firemen burned, 
how control a thouumd firm? Wth the dmtors dead and the 
haupitah d a d ,  how treat a quarter of a &on injured? 
Thcrt is one more novelty, A J a p m a  official st& in the 
rubbk and said to us: "All tbis fmm one bomb; it is unendurable." 
We l a d  what he meant. The Jtics of d Japan had bten put 
to aamt by the grcstt flights of E29s from the Marbas. But at 
Iwt there w a  waning, and a of temporary safety, If the 
paoplc of Kobe went through a night of inferno, you in PIT- 
were going to be dl right. The thousand-bomber raids were not 
con&; they even formed a pattern of action which the wai- 
wise Japanese could count on. But every hour of every day ahye 
any Japanese city tbur might be one American plane. And one 
bomber could now detroy a city. The alert would be sounded day 
and night. Even if the raiders m r e  over Fulnroka, you in b d a i ,  
a thousand miles north, must still fear death from a single plane. 
This is unendurable. 
The damage dane in the cities m c k  by the atomic bomb is 
not w y  to realizc. Houses and buildinp for a mile in all directions 
are totally destroyed. A good deal of comment bas been attracted 
by the ferroconarete structura whose walls still stand. Tha are 
very strong buildings. But they too were usela. I have bden in 
t h w  buildings. The window asanen& are gone, the interior walls 
art down, the roofs are dlagaed, the furniture battered, plumbing 
ftrtures and heavy machinery overturned. A great blast wind fd- 
I d  the shock and ripped through the buildins destroying their 
interim. Most of tbrm burned. Brick buildings, and even d- 
frame buildings with brick walls, are extremely vulnerable. At 
Nap& the Roman Catholic church was m old and heavy brick- 
wdcd  building nearly a mile and a half away, and it su%ercd total 
destruction. It i likely that an American city would be as M y  
dam& as a Japanm city, though it would Iook h d 
from the air. In Japan tbe wreekagt burned clean; in a Western 
aty, the rubble would stand in piles in the s w .  But the d~ 
would be just as ruined, and the people of the city as dead. 
The action of the Mast OR steel-frame fadory structurw is 
known from the d p  of the Mitsubishi T o r d o  Works in 
Nagasaki. Japanese homes are lightly built, but their f a c t o h  arc 
about like ours. And the Torpedo Worka buildin0 colIapd in a 
twisttd jumble of statl onto the h d  of the worhen and the 
turning machines, For a good mile and o hdf d factory structures 
were totdly dcstmyd. 
For t h e  or four miles there is heavy damage, makhg half 
the h i l d i i  unusable. In H i r d h  the fires which began a f m  
the blast, diwnc set by overturned stova and rhimntvg some by the 
heat from the bomb itself, burned for ten hours. The fl- stopped 
at the edge of the river. Many wae completdy destroyed bg 
fire which had ody been partly amasbad by the blast. It is not 
hard to understand that fire-fighting was impmibh 
Even more strilring than tbe damage to buildinp is the grctlt 
number of casualties. Very few w p l t  wen in shd- b ~ a e  
there was evidently no large bomber raid. VirtualIy all the people 
in the streets within a h a t  a d e  were k t ~ d y  md ~riously 
burned by the great heat of the b b .  Thm b u m  m v e d  all the 
exposed fltsh, somctimcs even clothing aught fire and burned the 
wearer fadly. People inside buildings were not burned by the 
fld, but were for the most part killed -or serioudy injured bg 
falling walls and beams. Caught in the wrackas of their homes, 
many were burned to death by the wndary fires. Of t h w  people 
within a thousand yards of the blast, about one in every house or 
two-perhaps five or ten perccnt-ixaped death from blast or 
from burn. By chance tbm people were screened from &e heat of 
the bomb by some object too li&t or too strong to kill them by 
falling upon them. Many literally crawled out of the wreck of 
fieir hmcs relatively uninjureda But they d i d  anyway. They 
died from the &cc?s of radium-like rays emitted in great number 
from the bomb at the insmt of the cxphsion. This radiation 
affcm the blood-forming tissues in the bone marrow, and the 
whole functioa of the blood is impaired The blood does not magu- 
late, but oozts in many spots through the unbroken s&, and inter- 
nally seeps into the cavities of the body. The white c o r p d e s  which 
fight infedon disappear. Infection prmpers and h e  patient diea, 
usually two or three weeks after the exposure, I am not a medical 
nun, but like all nuclear physicists I have studied tbis distast a 
little. It is a hazard of our profes4on. With the atomic bombI it 
b c  epidemic 
lh facts and figurcs of this and ither related eflccts of the 
atomic bnh are still under study. . . , I am not expert in these 
matters, and I have tried to tell you only the thinp I have seen. * * * *  
Professor Morrison's description concerns onlp the &vt 
IIWS of the first, relatidy primitive atomic h b s .  There is every 
reason to believe that larger, more powerful, d mom datructive 
bomb can be devdopcd mm-hnh which no city, of no matter 
what sk or constxuction, will be able to withstand. Thtre are no 
l i tat ions on the number of bombs that may be coacentratod on 
one target. 
it  is anticipated that in a rdativtly short time, perhaps five 
m ten pars, many nations will have large s&b of atomic bombs, 
unlm they prevaatcd from amwing them by an international 
agency for atomic energy. Even though our population and our 
indwtrp arc dispcmd m a large number of d towns, enough 
bombs probably m be made, matr or Iatcr, to datroy a large 
fraction of e m  such 4 I  towns. Enough bomb may, in fact, be 
accumulated to lay waste a signifmnt fraction of the-laud area of 
thii country. 
Other N a h m  can Man- Atomk Bomba 
The r e q u i m t s  for dcvcloping and producing atomic bomb by 
other nations may be considtrcd under five beadings: 
1. Pofobspiofi of scientifi and hchnicat inf omation.  
2. Possb~sion of an adeqwtr corps of s h t h t o  and enghems. 
3. Possts&n uf neeassmy ruw rnarhts. 
' 4. Possession of bltfficknt industrial plant and manufucturing 
eXpdtid11~6. 
5. Pos1~6sion of & p a t e   finance^. 
These pointe are considered separately in the order given: 
1. Present possession of scidntifi and technicat inf ormutiom. 
The h i c  scientific facts from which the atomic bomb was 
&v&pd were largely the discoveries of Eu- dentis&: 
nudear fmion, by Hahn, Ma-, and Strwamam of Germmy; 
transformation of uranium by ntutrws, by Fermi of I d y  ; theory 
of fission, by Bohx of b k  d Wheeler of the United States ; 
the neutron, by Chdwick of England; artifidaf r ~ o ~ v i t y ,  by 
Jdit and I. Curie of France. A mmple luting of s a w  of the fun- 
damend p a w  in the M d  of nuchar physia k included in the 
n a t  chapter. 
Speculation eoaotrning the posibility of a 5ssion dl& a- 
tioa and of the fission bomb was world-wide in 1939, 'and mu& 
( owld.not k known with aMin~ was whether the rnct prop e d a  of tbe nuclei conccmcd (which at that time could be d- 
mated d y  roughly) would pcrmit a cbain reaction and makc a 
bomb practical. This wa ccmpleteiy answered by the acwapapcr 
storks on August 6, 1945, x e v d h g  h t  an atomic bomb bad 
indeed c x p W  
Tbe Smph report (Atomic Enmgy for Militmy Pur#os#s, 
H. D. Smyth) has been relt888d by the War Departmeat md in 
available to all the world's scientists. This report G b e s  in eon- 
s i h b I e  detail the many mi& m o b  of a d  on the problem 
I 
of producing atomic e x p l i v e ~  and indicatts w M  of thest have 
b#n succasfully puahed to completion on a mas pnodudon d t .  
Most of the significaat numerical vdum for the nudear prop~rties 
am omitted, but the e x e e n t r r  by which they are measured are 
dauibed. This report p h  information in the ha& of sdentism 
at least equivalent to what was h w n  in this oounug toward the 
ted of 1942. It has ken cstimated that the remaining b l c d g c  
-a mas  of acimtific, tagincaing, rrnd technical. detail-if com- 
pletely released, wodd save my interned ooup of scientists 
only six months to a year in &cir dart to produce h h  
2. Poss~ssion of an adequot~ corps o j  scientists and ~ngineer~. 
Many scientists werc ctnploycd by the Manhattan Engineer- 
ing District on the proddon  of the h t  atomic bambs, including 
such wclI-hown mtn as Fermi, Oppmheimtr, Urey, h m c c  
snd Bohr. But now tbat the wveral methods which were so 
su-ful have hen revealed, other munuits no Ion- need such 
a g a k y  of talent as we bad availabk. All large countria a d  
several d l  o m  haw at their services morc than emu& cam- 
pctent nuclear p h y i c k ,  chemists and cqinaera to undertake and 
succeed in the production of atomic hdw. Many arc outsmding 
scientists and may devise cven btttu methds of production and 
even more dmuctivc bombs. Such trained ecicntkts as may work 
on the problem in other countries need concentrate on ody that 
one of the indiated methods m t  suited to thdr mom;  they 
do not nced to ensure their rruc~ws by trying simultaneously the 
many pmib1e avenw of a p p d  h t  we tried. 
3. Possestion of a#cessarg raw mi&Ic. 
Uranium, the only ~IX- raw material nor of c x t r d y  
common oecurrcnce, ip widely distributed on the earth's surface. 
Rid d&ts are known to be located in Canada, the Belgian 
&go, W h d o v a k i a ,  Portugal, Scandinavia and Rw& Dwbt- 
l a  othcr deposits bavc been found since interest in this metal 
arose during the war, and ccrtaidy the extensive prospecting which 
is sure to be u n d e m h  will r e d  mo* Anorher possibility for 
increasing the supply of uranium lies in the devdopmcnt of gmc- 
cssa for the working of low grade ores, wbich are extensively 
distributed, 
4. Possession of auffkicnr mdustki plant and mmufacturing 
sx#e&nc#. 
Mauy people have taken the position that though other coun- 
tries may have the necessary dcatific dent and the raw materids 
they lack the industrial p h t  and the background of accumulated 
industrid experience to manufacture atomic bombs. This padtion 
paten& ignom the accomplishmurts of other countries in mas 
producing, even before the United States did, such items as the V-1 
and V-2 rocket bombs; rbc Spitha, Hurriwncs, FdcWulfs, 
Marschmitts, Zeros and Stormwih ; rhe submarines that could 
travel indefmitdy under water; radar; the famed Russian heavy 
tanks, artillery and multiple rockets ; the jet-propelled p h t  ; a d -  
ficial rubber; gasoline from coal, and so forth. 
It must be s t r d  that a largt msnufacturing potential is 
not necessary for the m m u f m r c  of atomic bombs. lt is true that 
the Bomb Project made wide use of the industrial facilitia of this 
nation while they-were taxed by other war production. But other 
nations need undertalre to follow only m e  of the many sucpssful 
methods d i d &  in the Smyth Report, rtnd tbeir industria a n  
supply men and materials unencumbered by other war production 
or by the threat of destruction from Jr raids. For -pie, the 
Plutonium Project cast under 430 million dollars. It would be 
s&umt to dupliwte this efiort to produce atomic bombs. And 
the construction of the pi le  a d  the a s k a t a d  controlling ma- 
chinery need by no means entail the complexity, the "Swiss watch" 
prccisioa, which wc d. 
5,  Poss#tJioa of dequata finances. 
As stated before, tht m e  cogt of tbe Plutonium Project, 
which is s&cient for the mmufacmn of atomic bombs, was 
under 400 million dollars; &r p a a t h e  wmditiom, with t h e  
to consider more carefully the choice of me&ods and construction 
detail, doubtless the work can be duplkwd for much less. 
Recent txperience with Gemany and Japan makes appmpt 
that lack of large financia1 reserves is no deterrent to a determined 
nation. 
SUMMARY 
The production of the first atomic b o d s  rewired about three 
and oarhdf years. Of this time mrc than one year waa spent in 
proving the feasibility of a bomb. 
Since : 
(a) AU gations possess the basic scientific background and 
have the Smyth Report available to them; 
( b )  Many nations p~ssess m adequate corps of trained witw 
tistii and engineers; 
(c) Uranium and 0th newwry raw materials are widely 
distributed on earth; 
( d )  AU industrialized nations pwrsess an adequate plant and 
background of manufacturing experience ; 
(c )  Any nation, if willing to make the required financid 
sacrifice, can afford the n e c ~ r y  monetary outlay; 
there appear to be no material obstacles in the way of any fwgc 
industrialized nation, nor indeed of severaI smaller ones, to prc- 
vent them from duplicating or surpassing our effort in the p d u c -  
tion of atomic bombs in approximately the samc time. Other nations 
may well have atomic bombs in from two to five years. 
S c i e ~ ~  Papem oxz Fundamental Mseoveries in 
Nuclear Ph+ crpl Relabd to the A t o e  Bomb 
The purpose of this listing is to indicate in broad t e r n  the extent 
of the information cm'sthig in thc public liter?ture on the sigdieant 
points in tbe field of atomic G o n .  The papers cited r e p m a t  at 
mt a percent or two of the pubIished literature. Persons not well 
acquainted with this literature often underestimate the amount of 
information dready available to the scientists of the world. AI- 
though not a scientific paper in the usual en*, the -called Smyth 
Report, Dwslopmmt of Mtthods for Military Uses of Atomic 
Enargp, by H. D. Smyth, might be added to this list. 
The nativity of the authors is indimtcd for the purpose of show- 
ing the completdy international nature of the fundamend work 
in tihe field. It should be pointed out further that many of the men 
who contributed grcatljr to tht sumcis of the h r i e r r n  develop 
ment of the awmic bomb arc c i h  of other countries, often 
rcfugca fmm tbc Nazis. Thee men c o n ~ b u d  to the atomic 
b b  development as a caopcrative enterprise of the Allied 
Natiom Many of that men have M y  returned to their native 
countrig and others wiU roon follow. The information these mtn 
caxr~r in thtir brains obviously must be coaaidtrcd when evaluating 
the technical knowledge a d a b l e  tq the scientiik world, &CC it 
will m e  as basis for their mtiOued work and p u b t i o n .  
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IEow Atomic Bombs Map Be U d  in the Fuhue 
A single bomb, reported to have exploded at a height of 1000-1500 
f*, totally demolished more than four square d e s  of Himhima. 
Structur#i as far as m & from the cent& of the blsst werc 
reported levdd. Sixty thoussad persons were killed; one hundred 
fifty thousand more were casualties. A second bomb, dropped a few 
days later at Nagasaki, was reported to be an "improved" model 
making the first bomb already obsolctc. Even though the tenain 
was l a  f a v o ~ ~ c  than at Hiroshima, the damage was more severe. 
If no further improvements were to be made in the atomic 
tmmb or in its mode of ddivery, this would be the pattern of its 
use : A single bomber, or two or three, dispatehtd to a single tmgtt 
such as a medium-sized city (the United States has around 85) 
would eradidate it at a single blow. A country with a fleet of a 
thousand bombers, and an equal number of atomic bombs, could 
virtually annihilate an opponent ia a single night's optration. Evi- 
dently, surprise in u r a r f a r d w a y s  an advantagemay now be 
eome decisive. 
Defenses might conceivably be set up so that no uunimtified 
airplane could ever get withi bombing range of a city. Atomic 
explosives, howcver, may be uged in war-heads of stramphere 
rockers. Short range rockets such as the V-2 may be launched from 
ships or submarines at sea. Such long range rockets as the recently 
mtioned German "VcrgcltungswaW (V4) " were designed to 
reach the United Statee from Czcchdovakia, and the rockets dis- 
cussed by our military men were reportedly dcsigned to crow oceans 
and to strike within a given square milt, None of thesc rockctg can 
lx w d d  off as can planes. In Engltmd, although radio proximity 
f u m  were useful against plants and against the V-1 bomb, not a 
single V-2 rocket was prevented fm reolchiag its target. No 
e h t i v e  defense can be expected for the future.* 
The extreme power and compact s k  of an atomic bomb makc 
the use of either plants or r & ~  for their derivery unnmary. 
A compact "mine' or time bomb of atomic urplosive, smuggftd 
into the country, can h introduced into a city in m e  such simple 
faghion as in m automobile or light truck It can be disguised as a 
drum of fuel oil or hidden in a case marked "REFRXGERATOR!' 
Every public conveyance and means of public or private trmporta- 
tim thus bemaw a e b l ?  agent of dmeuction. Or, the 'hmr9iop" 
might be brought in piecemeal and -bled on the spot by an 
agent of an aggressor country. A soundless time mschanm or a 
radio-trigger tuned to a special signal can operate the detonating 
mechanism at the desired instant. Such a miae aced not be placed 
in any special strategic location; k t  any place within a mile 
radius of th prime target is da~t enough. Inasmuch as neither 
U-235 nor Pu-239, the bask materials of the atomic bomb, mi& 
any radiation permitting detection of its preemce fm a distance, 
detection of such time lmmb becornas very di3 idt .  
With rackets and mines available, the llext war, the Atomic 
War, wiU probably smt as a 'LpuPhbutton" srffair. Rather than 
mobilk armies and airforces and dadare formal h a d i t i t s ,  an 
-I: will one night set of3 a flight of mckcts and the light of 
morning will meal  only ruins where the citia of the victim once 
s t d .  A radio signal might accomplish the m e  wult by detonat- 
ing mines danttd ahead of time. Under these circumstapw the 
aggrmor need not be a large country nor om with a large army. 
Nor will the victim ntccssarily know the identiv of the w r .  
Dttcrmination of the point of origin of stramphere raclteb is very 
d&dt and atmnic mines, being comp1edy vaporized, leave no 
identifying pima 
This atreme premium on surprise and the striking of the first 
blow may mah even peaaful countria aggrcggors. In case of s w  
. picion thst another may strike, the only dTeetive defensive measure 
may bt to strike k t .  In any event, it is M y  that m i o n  of 
atomic ammcnts by many wuntrits will not lead to peace. 
Fear of retaliation by a country paamsing biggrcr and more 
efficient bamL is an insdcient deterrent to -ion. First, 
one must recognize that the dcdaion for or against war rests with 
m a l l  groups of men ; and it is their momentary d u a t i o n  of the 
dangers to their position and to the welfare of their country that 
decides ttie issue. Thrc is m guamtec that the price of h b l t  
maliation h one Prrhieh rhty arc unwilling to pay for the hn&ts 
they m t  from administering the first &ive blow. Popuhr 
apprehension of the dangers of retaliation with atomic weapwrs can- 
not be relied on to guide the decisions of the beads of governments. 
T h e  arc, m o m r ,  many situations in which m apparent 
superiority in atomic weapons d m  no? ncccmrily ld to a greater 
e&acy in theif emphpmtat for the pu- of retaliation. Since 
only a few hundred bombs are necmury to destroy tht a& a d  a 
major portion of the industry of a country as large ae the Unitcd 
States, in the event of an unchecked armamentar race even small 
nations may become as &cctivcly armed with atomic wcapom as 
their larger neighbors. Once a nation bas 8ecumulatcd enough 
bomb to destroy the dues of its intended victim, more bomb are 
of PO avail ; nor d l  its victim find safety in the m i o n  of an 
overwbdming numhr of bombs. For example, tbe nation intending 
aggression may rapidly evacuate the population from its own citits 
just before the unannounced attack. Thus, although a nation may 
suffer the lm of its Citie through redition by a better-armed 
victim its d t i e s  will likely be far fewer than those of the victim, 
A nation under duress may wdl decide h favor of a "victorp" in 
this limited SYW. 
Finally as mentioned above, the aggresrwr can wcU rrmain 
anonymous. The a d ;  mine and podilt developments in long 
range missilw atend to the aggrawr nation the hope that it will 
not suffer any retaliation. The rggmmr's objectivei may bc satis- 
fied without invading the  any's territory and thus rcvealiug 
its identity. Thus a commercid campetitor map be climinattd by 
crippling its indwdcg. 
Protection Agahd Atomic Bombs 
In the course of the history of w a r h e  there bsrn bEm stveral 
periods in which the b a h m  of o h  versus defense was upset, to 
the momentary advan- of thost in poss&on of suprrior o&dve  
weapons. During such perlotla cntcid battk and wen wars have 
baen won on the basis of the temporary suptriority of tht attack 
In the, homer, each such lead was e&ctivcly reduced, if not 
eliminated, by the development of some innovation in mtfensive 
&q=. The preceding d W o n  d m  not imply that the de 
structirc paver of all conventional weapons ha been aIhp&he 
dwmf.attd cities of Europe m mute evidence of of lack of ade 
quate dtfenm against m a d  bomber raids, for example. It i m p k  
only that a sort of cguilibrium has been d i s h e d  ktwaa of&nst 
aad defense, m that no s i d e  weapon could, unaided, sway the 
dcdsian. 
The development of the atomic bomb hzw greatly changed tbis 
traditional pattern of o h  perws d e k .  Nmer ha the 
bccomc so entirely dmninnnt. Never h a  &me bun a weapon whm - . , 
first application in an attack will be almost certain not only to * 
pnctrate the deft-, but also largely to demolish it. In tbb pwt 
war it was b b l e  for the A l l h  to win even though they were on 
h c  defensive for the first two years. In a future atmic war the 
active dcfcwt wiU be enormously w d c n t d  after the first few 
minu- 
The enommusly gxtatcr destructi~m~ss of the atomic bomb 
over that of any previous wawn means that an adequate d c f m  
must k d 4 g d  to prevent a very &rga fraetioit, if not all, of the 
atomic midla h reaching even the meinity of their tar-. 
It: must be abIe to do this ut all t h e $ ,  b , & g  mntinuous 
vi&nce in peace as in war, alert at a few scum& warning for 
&dent operation, and must be p r e p a d  for any surprise attack 
or new attacking techniques. 
The atomic bmb i n d  the de8~uctivcnms of cxpIdvts 
by several millionfold ; swnt fiimiIslrly fantastic improment in 
the abilitp of the &fa either to wsrd oL the bIow or to abaorb 
ib uhock is now required. Romantic qmdations on the m i r a h  
which dmce has wrought in the course of the last war arc not a 
sound Wi for evaluating the ~ U t i a  of such a d e b .  Not 
only d m  the presmt atomic bbmb have au enonnous Iead over any 
existing dcfcnse, but progma h not M y  to be codbed to measures 
of defense. Much more d m & c  bombs in great numks, deliv- 
ered by a large variw of new carriers, arc likely to ofistt any gaina 
in defense. I 
Any d o h  must be h d  on: (1) reducing the number of 
missiles thrown; (2) interfering with their aim; (3) di5pueing 
all podile targets for an attack; or (4) absorbing the shock of 
t h m  which strike their tar- 
The d d l y  new rn*ndple employed in the atomic h b  
has led to m #@ation in th popular mind that a h i h r I y  
original principle might be develod  which d d  destroy the 
bomb or its U c  m a r i a 1  at a distance. In our p i ~ t  mtc of 
howledge, bow in this matter iqqmr wholly hw'n~;  the 
atomic expldve is e m  frar from hterft~wce from a distance 
tbm any atdinary ~ M W .  Any active defense must 4 directed 
towa& the bomb's 6, 
What m y  be & the positive d h ,  amhhg of ag- 
&vc action a g a h t  the a t d c  bomb d m ,  ddmd to pre- 
vent them fram reaching tKi targets or to dtstmy thun in prmm~ 
of dcliv~y, must be as varied as the pomiilc modes of delivery. T o  
bc satisfactory, a system of defense must bc highly &&VG d t  
convcntiod bombers, jet propelfed pIanes, V-1 type b- h b ,  . 
md V-2 type r h ,  to account only for the tppcs of d m  
known at present. Tbe recent progress in speed of miIitary air- 
craft, which tends to favor the attacker, m b  it unlikely that a 
suEdently laxg fraction of the attacking planes wiU be shot down 
far from their targets, even with the aid of radar, high speed fighter 
plan-, and such devices m proximity fuses, The m e  may be said 
of V-1 bum bombs and of the n m ,  f a ~ t  ypes of jet and &t 
planm. In the past war 1 &fa capable of shmthg down 20% 
of the bombers in an attacking fora wss considered &kt. With 
due wnsidcration for the factor of surprise it is difficult to see how 
any measures of defem could bt relied on to maintain thc required 
very high &ciency. Atomic attacks are most likely to bt unan- 
n o d  MOWS stryck during peace, gcrhaps by supposedly mful 
commercial planes on routine flights, or hy piIotless launched 
by ships or gubmarinar near our shores. 
Stratm~here r& of the V-2 type, travding at mds of 
3500 mifes pti hour (twice m fast as a high v d d ~  &d), pre  
sent a problcm of a still a t r e n t  order. Not one of those aimed 
at ~ n d a n d  was rvcr ahot down. The deteaion of an a p p d n g  
long range & by radar is eapablc of giving no more tban a 
few seconds or minuta wamhg, according-to the radar atpexw 
DifGeult as the detection of a rocket m'dle appears, it is an easy 
prob1e.m in comparison witb its actual interception. Conventiond 
anti4maft weapons, such as fighter plane or shells, an much 
too slow. Only counter -d t s  guided by radar show even tanote 
promise. The system wouId have w be so complicated, and its op 
emtion would be contingent upon so many unknown and uncon- 
trollable factors, that it is im-ile to bclievt it could be made 
1CU% e M v e ,  e6paclpaclallY against pasi'b1t amation tactics em- 
pIoycd by the tntmp. 
An effective system of defense for a t ~ &  bomb must & 
hh account of various w%ilities for stcr~t  ddivtry of tbe bomb 
in &c form of preplmted mineg, Since the bombs arc d, they
may bt mnuglglcd into the country disguised as freight shipmena, 
or t h q  may k eanied in p i a m d  via diplomatic pwch or by 
secret landinp on our shora and then mcmbIcd and plmtcd in 
our cities or other strategic Iocatiom by enemy agents. Such miam 
can bt set off by a variety of mcdunims, at a pxearrantaged signal. 
They unit no radiations which m i ~ h t  render than open to detec- 
tion, and they may be hidden, cvco buried underground, and still 
be enormously destructive. Mines can more certainly destroy their 
targets than can other methods of delivery such as planes. Their 
use attache a bigh premium to diciency in counar-espionage as 
a first line of defense. Even if it were possible to establish a rigor- 
ousi 8 p t e ~  of inspection of all matmi& entering the country, md 
a periodic and thorough inspection of all our citits, it is hardy 
conceivable that such a set of protective measures can be made 
100% cffectivt. 
T o  date, the only proposal for a defense which, realistically, 
seems to o h  any assurance whatever of diminishing the hazards 
of an a t d c  bomb attack upon this country is that which consists 
in rendering us a less attractiolt for any adversary. This 
country, because of its tremendous concentrations of population, 
industry, government and transportation f a d i t i ~ ~  in a relatively 
small number of metropolitan centers, is o m  of the most vulacr- 
able of all to atomic weapons, which art most efficiently employed 
against such concentrations. If we were to embark on a large scale 
&rt to disperse the popddon, industry, government d trans- 
portation systems of aU of p r  cities and industrial conmmtiom, 
to spread them out u n i f d y  wer the habitable area of tbe coun- 
try, we could greatly minimize the effecb of an attack upon us. 
Further, we mig.ht place many important factories underground. 
T o  dcct the same destruction, an enemy would then have to a& 
us with several thousand rather &an several hundred bombs. It is 
obvious &at sucb a promam codd onIy be m i e d  out at the cost 
of industrid &dency, aud with the s& of our standard of 
living, and of our free institutions and persad libutim. It has 
been estimated, for ~campIc, that th ast of dispersing our citim 
to towns of no more than 100,000 population would be about three 
hundred billion d o h  Moreover, it b probable that only tun- - safety would be gained, for several nations have withim 
their productive =padti- the manufacture of even mamy thousands 
of atomic bombs, within perhaps au lit& as twenty years, and such 
a program of d i s d  couId not be -dished in less than, say, 
ten pePrs. 
~ i t a p ~ a a ~ a b l e d ~ t h a t n o ~ t i d n  
of n a t h d  &.fcws is mpable of giving us any amurana of safety - 
in thc event of r large d t  attack with atomic bomb. It is prab 
able that a well prepad nation auld save i t d f  from subjwtion, . 
but not fmm the ravage3 of an ovtrwhebing destruction. Thus 
we must re& our en& philmby of d e b  If we fmd that we 
must exkt in a world id which nations can freely arm thcmsclva 
with abomie kh, we must o r p h  d v e s  to withstand a 
Tear1 Harbor on: mtianwidc d c  and stii survive ta pmmt 
the accupation of our coun&y, 
I 
& a t d e  armaments raa  will be a continuous threat w the ex- 
ism of & aatim as w d  as to h a t  of the other mtiom of the 
world. Such a t h t  caa b i t  be avoided by rhe abolition of atomic 
WCIL- by international agreement. Thus our high& national 
interm lim m ooopuatid y &wing &tive intermtionid con- 
trol of a&c cxplosivcs. E m  the dization of the potential p e s t  
t h e  bend3~- of a t d c  mew must needs b subordinated to this 
aim. 
Pat expience &om that pcrret will not be mara~tud by 
a Cuvenaat bmm sovereign mtiom which merely agraes to out- 
I& atomic weapons as a '%gihaze*' means of warfare, Such atn 
agrcumnt-will ba iasiuf6cicnt to prevent aggrdvely miadd wun- 
trim from dovclopinff their own atomic armmen- An a-t 
ta OU&W 4~ w t a m  ~ t d y  be &&ve in pre- 
venting their mmufamre in any nation if it is supported by 
(a) an ef6activc method or methods of supemisha, by inspec- 
tion and Pther means, to makc reasonably certain that no nation ie 
cland#stincry engaged in making atomic egp1osivt m a k a l  or 
atomic bwnb while other nab abide by the covenan& and 
( b )  a mxbanhm for aaforcc~ttnt o be applied against t h e  
groups or individuda wbo ilIegaUy pduce  atomic mapom. 
The p lcobh of s u h i o n  will be e o d c r e d  without discussing 
I methods of enfommnt. 30th are steps toward world govtrrunent 
Iby Iaw, but the 6mt step may ty b e e r  to & k d i a t e l y .  
Xntcr& mpCrVisiap1 of atomic cxplasim rn be based 
on foui principles, 
(a) C o n d  of raw materiab 
(b) Control of production 
(c> Control of personnel 
(d) Dhemimtion of information 
Cofitral of raw mrttsriah. All known atomic aplosive pre  
d& mtthods require uranium as a primary raw material. 
Therefore, if all mtions could be prevented from obtaining more 
thaa a limited mount of uranium, they w o f  d be d 1 e  to make 
a& hb.  World-widt atomic cntrgy control should indude, 
themfort, the ~upervision of alI uranium mines by M international 
control d i o n  with docation to each country of only such 
amounts of uranium we as wodd m a h  the fabrication of atomic 
bomb very d W t  
A nation might evade this of control by d y  working 
uranium ore dcpmits which hid not been reported. To mah such 
evasion difficult, the international control authoritg &odd main- 
tain a staI of iaspectors. A11 countria must rmpower thcsc aguaB 
to inspect mines which might-be suspected of producing uranium 
as the main product or as a by-product. 
To faditate lhis inspection, every nation muld bt mpwtcd 
to give full information on all mining activitia, and to aid the 
inspactor8 in carrying out aerial survey flights ma regions in which 
g d o g i d  conditions make the txc~rrmct of uranium om prohbIe. 
The d i a h i t p  of this Iwt method of inspection will hinge on the 
degree of certainty with which an uncharted mine can be lacated 
from the air. It apperrrs probable that evasion would be based on 
the utilization of lm-grde ores since highIy concentrated uranium 
ore d c p i r s  are very rare The utilization of such low-grade ore 
will n h t a t e  the moving d p- of larm rtmounes of 
rmk which will probably be d B d t  to a n d  from aerial o b a -  
tion. T o  dmtc thi cuntro1, the finding and charting of all 
uranium ore deposits could perham bt made n task for aa inter- 
n a h a l  grologid survey unit. 
A M d e  f t l t t ~ ~  of miniag~~ftoIs is that any evasion 
d-d is at the furtht rewlvad from. the h a 1  produe 
tioa of bwnbs, so that an w l y  wstning may be given. , 
Control of prodUciSon of firi9nabId mat&?#. h in tht con- 
~ 0 f ~ t h t c o n t m l 0 f p r o d ~ w i l l h a v t t h t t w o u s ~  
of m d w  of legitimate produdon and detection of illegal 
productialn. 
For legitimate production thc mk of th cwtrofling smcp 
will bt to emure &at pproduaion of fissionable mateids in reg- 
b r e d  plmb or labomtoria remaias within m ' b c d  limits, and 
that thc.matdals so ~mducd are wed d y  for ''legitimate*' pur- 
poa& It will be mcmwy to make certain, for example, that ttme 
hionable matcriah remain in atomic power generators, and are 
not d i v e d  to the production of atomic h b s .  This inspcdon 
mk would Lx much d m p W  if neither industrial atmic power 
plants nor plants producing Mona& materials on a large scale 
were permitted. If the only 'Icgitimate" plan& were d d e  
( a h t  the s h  of the present pilm), they wodd urrurti- 
tute no danger, sinet they could not prduce enough hionaMe 
material to mak even one lmmb in a PU;d of years. 
The probluu of h d g  unreported plants which are 
meant to produce atomic clrpldvar is om rapuiring detailed study. 
ME& must be dwkd wbicb will be suitable for the detection 
of each of the various trim of plants developed so far-plutonium 
production pIants, diffusion plan& for the separation of uranium- 
235, -tic scp~llltion plants, etc. 
T b e  laigc sk and the large &triad power consumption 
oftha#pfanf~,apwelrnmthrmnm,suggost~pesasmeans 
of d d n .  Thus, existing k i c a n  installations could bt d r  
teaed by thdr p r d t y  to large b y d d d c  power smtions. In 
addition, each type of plant is distbguihble by numbers of char- 
actcristic machima rrod insmmcnta, which are not netdad in ocrm- 
parable quantity for other indmtrid purposm For m p l e ,  large 
numbera of aatrifugaI pump8 arc chawtcrhic of -us diffu- 
sion plants ; numbers of large arc d primarily in 
e l a m n a g d c  scprvation plants; and rsr#asive remote control 
mcebmisms arc u d  in plutonium proddm plank Morawer, 
cutaia materials (e.g., graphite) are requid in large qumtitie 
or in a high deproe of purity p r h d y  for the production of U-235 
or plutoaium. 
Such duee would bc useful ta tbe iarpcctm of the control 
canmimilon for the hteea'on of unrcportad plan* Shoe tbcse 
, bwctm WilI optrat+? openly, rrad not m t l y ,  they Wiu acad to 
travel without hindrance thrwghout any country, to iatemim 
whmcver they wish aad to enter dI planta and hbratorim ihcy 
d d r e  to bpm% 
T o  aid in the program .of impaction an international hbora- 
tory could be set up, s d e d  by competent dent ists .  Such a labo- 
ratory codd mtablish standards for power p b ,  for s m d  p k ,  for 
produdon of radioactive materials, for isotope separation p h t s ,  
etc. It could substantidy aid the corps of inspectors through 
I 
analysis of the ways in which the controls might be evaded. 
Controt of sciantific a d  techtrical # e r ~ o n ~ l .  The fabrica- 
tion of atomic b b s  in this country has required the mobilization 
of a whole gillaxy of scientists and technicians. While atomic bombs 
might now be made in another country without such a unique 
concentration of dent, their production would still require the 
partidpation of a number of scientific md engineering specialists. 
Fomd registration and accasiond checking of the whereabuts 
and d v i t k  of such ptmnd (including students) would stwe 
as s 8tmble -ry h o d  for the detection of illicit atomic 
bomb - mearch or production. 
I t  has bun suggested, that personal intercourse among scien- 
dsts of different countries could serve as a valuable aid in the 
detection of secret lx&e atomic weapon devclopmenb. There 
might be lecture tours, student trips and exchange of rcstarcb 
workera among countries. Sdentists in aU countria would be en- 
eo& to M thcmselvts guardians of atomic dhmament, and 
ta give thdr loyalty to the international control authoriw The 
lon&lished tradition of world-wide eoopcration among den- 
tists would serve as a basis for such a rcgmnsiiity. 
DisJdmination of inf otmrrtiofi. T o  hdp tnsurt that no coun- 
try em take advantage of discwerim in the fidd of atomic weapons 
made by that nation's dentists, tbe control authority should guar- 
antee freedom of publiaztion of aH scientific findings. The grcst 
majority of scientists h e  world over adhere strongly to the tradi- 
tion of fm and full publication of their work. 
* . * *  
In k n g  the tlktivcness of a system of supervision based 
on the above four points, it must be borne in mind tbat absolute 
certainty of detection may not be needed Even a high probability 
of detection is likely to deter nations from smting dandmtinc 
produetian of atomic ~ I o s i w s .  A nation inanding aggression 
will have only a d cbanct to acquire a decisive hcadstart. It 
will rccognh that d&on will muIt either in irmrtcdiate action 
against it by 0th nations, or at kt, in an open amaxnt11b race 
in which it bas no decided advantage, Nations with p~actful in- 
tentions, reassured that no secret bomb production codd go on 
without great likelihood of detection, d l  not fed t b d v t s  
compelled to violate the sgrtanent for motives of Jf-protection. 
The probability that violations will bc publicly rccognhd will 
. thus make a covenant including supervision vaIuablt even if it is 
not supported by a m e c b h  of euforcaat. 
The conclusions of scientists with regard to the problem of 
supervision is that a system muld be set up by an international 
authority which would afford a m a b l e  certainty of detection 
of evasions. The addition of a mechanism of police action against 
violators of the controls wodd be dtsirablt, if the avoidance of an 
atomic armaments race t to be mark artain. 1 ntcrnational control 
of atomic weapons, even if supported by supervision rrnd police 
action, does not constitute a positive assurance against war. It is, 
however, the only method of dealing with the threat of atomic 
war, short of establishing world government, It will at feast a&rd 
a temporary respite in which to further the im of pcrmllncnt 
peaa on earth. Any invasion of industrid secrecy or limitation 
on the independence of national adon which may bE required 
will be a small price to pay for this achicvcmnt. 
Future Uses of Atomic Energy* 
The urgency of war prublaas left little time for the few scientists 
with &dent knowledge of nuclear engineering to reRcct about 
the future padilltie of nuclear energy. The txclusion of non- 
prajoct scientists from technical information about atomic energy 
and the dentific detds on which its development depends has 
made really original ideas about f utum applications-ideas which 
come from fresh viewpoin~rmarkably scarce. Meverthelws, the 
field of ustfulaes of atomic energy is so enormous that even the 
applications which have already been thought about ("without 
trying," one might be tempted to say) change compledy conypts 
of the poseibIc and the i m k b l e .  
In short, atomic energy plants have pomibilities of w which 
are - t i d y  unique. 
The of at& energy units which give them 
thtst valuers arc thetr mmpactnt$~ with huge power capacity, and 
their economy of "fuel." They are known generally as "pila" 
btcause the first experimental one made was a pirc of graphite and 
uranium atacbd together a parti& way. 
Thus, a million-kilowatt tlrctrical power plant n d  be no 
b i g p  tban a big+ power substation, with the pile i d f  only a 
part of the whole. h m p m  thh with the tmnd011~ suuctum 
of Boulder Dam, Muscle Shoals or Grand Coulee, water-power 
unib wifh roughly gimilar apacities. 
An idea of the fuel economy of the pile as a power mum may 
be obtained by comparing the bulk of a pound of uranium or 
plutonium with that of 1500 toas of coal, which gim when 
burned, about the mnt amount of energy as the pound of d t l ~ l  
or plutonium d m  when din the piIe. Sidarly, 250,000 
gallons of futl oil, or 40 &ion cubic feet of natural lrre ah 
approximately equivalent to a pound of uranium: One pound of 
uranium or plutonium, as will be pointed out in Chspber X, 
is mpable of yielding almmr twelve million kilowatt-hours of 
energy, enough to supply the total power consumption of the 
United Stam for a.-r of an hour. An atamic plant 
operating at the million-kilowatt Ievd thus needs only about two 
pounds of uranium or plutonium a day, a good bit w i e r  to trans- 
port &an 3000 tom of coal. 
Many rich areas lie relatively unused because of lack of fucI 
or power, and many wasteful procedures arc part of our economy 
' h u d i e  raw m a d s  arc found far fram their dace of hl use. 
Thc combination of virtum m d  by a pile---, in- 
dependence of natural watercourses, and relative freedom from 
supply p r o b h s - m b  for padhilitia which might earlier have 
been dismigsed as fanciful dr- . 
With heat a d  power supplied by a pile, the rich Alaskan 
arms might be made livable and highly productive. Ores need 
no longer be shippad long distancw in their crude form but their 
valuable coastitutnts may be &d at the &a. Bauxite, for 
example, might bt bansformed into duminum at the mine, amad- 
ing the long and wasteful shipping from South America it now 
u n d e r p .  Magnmium, now assuming impormna rts a %truchmd 
light metal, can bc manufacturrd at the d o r e ,  as it is a major 
constituent of strr water. Many economieu in m r t a t i o n  of both 
materials and tlectrid power might be c&actad by mategic h- 
tion of atamic energy power plan#. 
In its present staw of dedopment, atomic energy doa not 
compete with -on f d s ,  but this d not be the c ~ s e  in the 
future. W e x  the trahload upon trainImd of 4 which sup 
plies winter fuel for cities such as IMhwapob, Chi-, Pi* 
burgh, and many othem A central heating plant for caeh d these 
cities (a pile, whase mcrgy would be u d  to warm air or form 
stcam) would not only free m p o r b t i o n  for other itam, but 
would dimhate the characteristic winter amasphere of eaat 
mokt and soot. Furthermore, the ad sn saved would be available 
for &emid use, to give synthetic g d i n c ,  and to furnish the basic 
ingradients for the many plastics, fibers and other synthetic chem- 
icals which are coming into use more and more, 
After indimti% smm of the damling pmspcts opened up by 
atomic energy dedopmcnt, it is perhaps important to indicate 
those for which atomic enma (as exemplified in the uranium 
pile) amnot be used. The limitations depend p+y on certain 
p b p i d  +mctdtiics of the unit. Here we need only poiat out 
that the pile is the sou= of very in- and very dangerous I&- 
tiom, so that for the protection of those in rhe M t y  an en- 
circling shicld of many fact of concrete or other proper mattriaIs 
is -tiL It is estimated tbat such a Bhield alone would weigh 
over fifty tons for the most compact sort of power systtm. 
Another limitation is the fact that even though a very d 
amount of powtr may k desired, a large amount of mated  must 
bt invested initially. This fact is related to the concept of "crit id 
size" which is &cussed elsewhere. Tbe minimum mt of materials 
for a power unit may well run into hundreds of thousands of dd- 
lars. I t  therefore becoma uneconomic to consider atomic energy 
uaie for low power usa  such as, for m p I e ,  the lighting, heat- 
ing, and air-conditioning of individual dwellin= 
In addition to the factor of exonmy, tbt factor of weight 
. will r u t  out the use of atamic power for vehidts such as auto- 
mobila A power unit as havy d - as that indiated a h  
would aImmt u d y  a h  bt out of the qumtion for any airplane 
yet built, and its usefulness in driving railrod trains is equally 
problrmatid.* A i- ship might: ptrhaps h d  the weight anlad 
s k  of a uranium or plutoarium power p h t  within tolerable 
limits, but many factors would need to be weighed mrtfully before 
a decision to use piles as a motive force for ship were made. On 
the whole, therefore, the advent of atomic energy wiI1 not immt 
diattlg revdutionize tmmpor~etion. 
It may, on the other hand, firovide the key to s p a  travel 
which bas until recently bacn k e d  complebely fantastic But it 
is true in this case as in dl the o h  cited that p r o m  will bt 
made only when orptrts in diverst fieIds are a l l o d  to spetk 
freely with the atamic power experm. Continued maintenance of 
secrecy barrim stifla p r o m  within the atomic &rgy field as 
welf as without. 
Tantalizing as the prospace of lar& atamic power plants 
are, it may very wd1 be that power wilI not be the most important 
product derived from thc operation of atomic energy units 
("piles"). The prospects of power are actually of 1- &mediate 
importance than are the pussibilities owned up t h r o e  the pro- 
duction of radioactive suhtanecs even in dl pile. In othcr 
words, piles wilI be useful, and important for the production of 
radioactive wbstanw aud penetrating radiations even during the 
period in which power piIes are not ceonomically practical, Sucb 
radioactive substances bave been made before, in minute qounts, 
by mans  of cyclotrons and similar apparatus, but the use of a pile 
wiU make possible the manufacture of tremendously larger 
amounts of such materials. While all the use of radioactive sub- 
stances cannot bc foresem at the prtseat time, enough wort was 
done before the war with the tiny mounts avahblc then to point 
out the directions future work may th. 
G t w d  Fields of Ussfuhterr 
Probably the most important uses of &me new substanas 
will be in tbe fdd  of && in medicine and biology, 
in industrial p-, and h pure &UI~C. 'kdopmcnts in alf 
of t h e  fields wiU be greatly acccltrated, for the avairability of 
large amoun~ of radioactive substanas will put into the hands of 
r ~ c h  men a new and most powerful mI-ont which will mak  - 
AU ~ w i a  l c l e a ~  voabalvp k iacltukd u Chaptar XIV at tbs sad (li tba 
, : '- 
&Mc the gathering of knowledge mttainsbte by anp 06 
means. h d k c t i v i ~  givcs pxomise of being as important to 4- 
ical and biologicrrt research as was the micrmpc, as hmt to 
ch& rcw.arch as wgs the chcmid b&m, and as imparkant 
t o p h ~ r m d s r s m s t h e ~ p e .  
t 
Xn this ncw era of rapid scientific and technologid dtvdop 
menti the d e m t i o n  of all kin& of mearch meam that adva~xs 
k the wtll-bing of man will be made more rapidly, that c u m  for 
will be discovered more rapidly, and that new products 
and materials will be dcvdopad, wbich may give rise to great new 
industria comparable ia s h  and importance to the synthetic rub 
btr, the plash,  M the light metals indusuiwr. 
From dkwcrits made before the war, it was already evident 
&at radioactive hbsmees will find direct use in medicine for the 
treatment of certain d b ,  and that in iadu~~trg they will ~ b l e  
m y  p- w be d d  OII more &endy a d  ~ ~ n a r m i d y ,  
hdiationr and Su&~tmccs Pmdutd by a Pile 
Thick con- or s t d  shidds arc built around piles as pro- 
tection against their in- gamma and neutron radiations, simi- 
lar to t h e  wbhh injured and killed so many paopIe in the stomic 
exp4dons at Himehima and Nmaki. Th- radiations can bt 
made available for contmlld medical or industrial use through 
~ I I X  cut in the sbicldiag. The diation is emitted as r bttrm 
through t h e  ports. Such use of these radish is co&d to the 
vicinity of tbt pile. It is an important extension of the usefulnm 
of the piE that it can be used to manufacture ether highly an- 
ecntatcd and portable sou- of pagcaetratiag m d h k  
These souras of radiation arc radioactive materials* formed 
in the pile, whieh are concentrated into a gmall bulk aad which 
may then be shipmd away in suitable con- I t  is  not 
to prepare portsblt mums which will tmit gamma rrays with the 
intensiq of the pile i d f ,  nor is it generally wibh to prepare 
f 
strong s o u m  of neutrons. For most pwmss, however, sucb con- 
con~enmad, portable sourcc~ of beta and gamma rap rrs are avail- 
able will be convenient and maxe than ad-. 
Radioactive matwids may be p ~ d u d  in the pile by m 
mtthds: (1) idation of h i o n  product$** and (2) activation 




may k inintroduced into the dtsired rtrta. Afacr a short time, it will 
have draapptarcd by rdoactive didntegmtio~ 
Another method of using the radiations from radioactive sub 
stances in therapeutic work is by feeding or injecting them ia a 
form which may h stored in the a & d  organs. Thuq d i d v e  
phosphorous has k n  athhistaed in the mtmtnt of leukemia, 
bdng wncentrated in the blood-forming organs; and the conccn- 
tration of radioactive iodine in the thyroid g l a d  has ban usad to 
treat thyroid a, S i n smntium tends to k concentrated in 
the bones, it has be#1 m q g g e t d  that radioactive strontium a n  be 
usad in the tmtmcnt of h e  tumors. These arc some of the pro- 
d u r c s  triad Wore the m; with the availability of large m- 
tities of all kin& of rrrdioactive materials, from radioactive 
phosphorou to radioactive d c ,  many more similar USFS will 
bc &dopad. 
W e  must avoid d n g ,  however, that a a d d  cancer 
cure is just around thc COMCT~ Somc tumors are actually more re- 
sistant to rap of d kinds than the n o d  body tissu~s, which 
must, of mume, rcmin rchtively undamaged during tbc trtatmcnt. 
Mormr,  there is still no curative tramen? for eanctr which 
has became d k n h t e d  throughout thc body. We axe jusrificd, 
however, in bdiering that many improve men^ in cancer treatment 
will follow the invmtigatian of the we of new radioactive sub 
a m ,  jwt as =&a d wisdom have constantly improved 
the rtaulb from the tm of d i u m  and X-rays. 
2. Use of Rdioaczive Materials ar "Tr~cers" - A most impor-t use of radiaactive s u b c c s  depends upon 
the fact that txtremety sensitive h n m e n m  (e.g., "Geiger-Muller 
owam") are available for the detection of the radiations from 
radioactive materials. It is pomiblt to d~ thc presence of very 
tiny amoun* of thcst substances. For example, it is possiie to 
detect a d i o n t h  part of a millionth of an ounce of radium. If 
radio&* material is added to non-radioactive materid, it is 
paasible to follow the mixture by &g instruments to determine 
w h m  the r a d i d v i t g  bmrs gwe. For exampk, it & w i b I e  to 
foUow tbt flow of gas through tr complicated system of pipcs and 
reactom by adding a d mount of a radioactive gas and fol- 
I h g  the migration of the dioaetivity with a "Geiger-MuUcr 
counter." This is an -PI= of the simpler of the t& types of 
Y - - I d 3s 
usa  for a "traar," mmdy, following the bulk movemcnt of a 
liquid, gas, or d i d .  
In tht stcond type of applimioa, radioactive tracers are used 
to follow a parti& chemical compontnt of a mixture. T o  & 
a s p d c  example, if cop= d h p m  from a solution as it flows 
through a &stan of pim, it is possible to determine where the 
copper is being loat. When a d amount: of r a d i d v c  copper 
is added to the solution, this radioactive copper travels with the 
normal copper and is lost at the the place. This region can then 
be located by using a Gei~r-Muller counter to detect the gamma 
rays emitted by the radioactive copptr. 
The IW of such s p d i c  radioactive tracers dtpends upon the 
fact thar all forms of an element bavt tsscntialiy the same chemical 
and physical properties. Thus, the ehtnt  cob& normally is com- 
postd of atom called cobalt-59. Wben bombarded with neutrons, 
another form of this element is made, called cobalt-60, which is a 
radioactive substance. It has a life time tneasurcd in years, and 
diiintcgrates by emitting a beta-ray and a gamma-ray. The stable 
a* cobalt-59 and the radioactive atom cobalt#, aaa  they are 
mixed, will travel together through any kind of chamid reaction. 
Thus, the whereabouts of a large amount of ordinary cobalt 
(~pMt-59) may be fdowcd by "&acing" a minute amount of 
cobalt-60 mixed with it. 
IadturrinI Uses of Tracers. Radioactive tracers already have 
been used industrially to measure the flow of liquids and  gas^ in 
the manner of the example given above. Thus petroleum engineers 
have used radium as I tracer to map oil p d .  Wium mixed with 
oil is pumped down a wd, and its distribution is measured by its 
radioactive properties. Bteausc of the great sensitivity of d a d s  
for detecting r a d k t i v e  mamiah, it is podble to find the radium 
c v a  after it hm k c o m  g ~ a t l y  diluted by being spread through 
a large ml. 
l2adiaactivc tlemmts may greatly simplify chrmicd analysis 
problems in p h t  production work, such as the n h b g  of s d .  
Very often it' is to hold up a pmms until a time-roamun- 
iag chcmid analpsis bas btm made by the bbora~ry, If a tracer 
iS iPtrodued at tbe &inning of the p-, it ia possible to 
set up simple, quick, and ofan autamatic naalyses by radioactivity 
mcasur~aent which wiH diminah the usual holdup. Such a process 
bas beea patented for followinp phwphorous in steel rdning. 
Hydrogn is one of the important elemtab composing pew* 
Ieum. F b d i d v t  hydrogen usad as a tracer has already supplied 
valuable information as to what gcics on in the proms of "cracking" 
petrdcum, a p m  which produms highquality, gasoline and c 
otber valuable chcmid.  It has been m i b l e  to find out a great 
deal about what occurs to the mmpIimttd molecules comprising 
petroleum during the cracking process, and such knowledge in- 
evitably Ieads to improvements and new developments. 
Chemical Research Uses of Tracers. The use of tracers in 
g e n d  dentiiic r~starch wiII d y  ucpmd utmcadody a~ 
soon as the materids are available. The organic chemist, for tx- 
ample, is c o n c e d  with a vast number of compounds camposed to 
a lsrge -t of carbon and hydrogen. As mentioned before, a 
radioactive form of hydrogen is available ; a radioactive carbon has 
h k n  made. With thest two, the organic chemist may be able 
to determint just what hap- to o&c molecules when he beats 
them, or boils than, or causes them to react. With such knowledge, 
he can learn how to make them more may, and more &=ply; and 
he can learn how to make more and more useful compounds. Ca& 
sidering that a very great portion of our chemical industry k based 
upon orgzmic chemistry, basic advan- in this field are sure to 
exert par influence. This h d y  a limited exmpIe of -what the 
availability of xadi~ctivc w e n  for alI the drmcnts can mean 
to c h i d  resum&. 
Biological and Medical Uses of Tracers1 One of the im- 
portant use of tracers in biology and medicine is to fiad out how 
the human body functions. It has bttD the experience of the past, 
that when such ImowIedp is available, methods of devising cures 
for discms arc greatly simplified. When bacteria could be iden- 
tified under the m i a m p e ,  the attack on bacteria diseases b e  
much tasier. The use of mra made by cyclotron bombardment 
has already revolutionized much biological and medid  r d ,  
because arperimcna may be attempted wbich arc impassible with- 
out tram. 
Some of the uscs of r a d i d v e  tracers art f&ly obvious. 
Thus, the rate at which the b f d  flows through & and v e h  
can w i l y  be measured bg injecting the tracer at one point and 
measuring the time which d a r n  b t h  it arriveai at the win 
where tbe deacdng device is p M .  In a similar fashion, the rate 
at which sap rim in plants may bt fwnd directly. 
The conaentration of a subsmm in a certain part of the body 
can k W y  dmmstmtsd. The accumulation of iodine ia the 
thyroid can bt shown by placing a counter on the neck after radio- 
active iodine is adminhmcd. This method bm bben uead to study 
tbe nature of van'ous d b  of the thysoid, in which the gIand 
may be avid for iodine, or may refuse to store it. It is dm possible 
to determine, by injecting a very d amount of radioactive 
id& into a patient with thyroid cancer, whether it is worth while 
to treat the patient with a much trgcr amount, or whether opera- 
tion ia & foa. 
Tbesc aad similar u m  of doac t i ve  traars hardly scratch 
the 8urfaa of the p)%d'bilitiwr. a u t e ,  aon-p&mo~ amounta of 
arum vitamins, rtad be ~ O U O W C ~  ZCOUICI ia the wy 
by the radioactive .tr= method, bacause of tbe great d e t d o n  
sensitiviw, "Tag& dmp will slud new light on fhe site and 
m& of action of therapeutic agents (such as the "sulfa" drugs 
sad pmidllin) and allow a totally ntw a@ to medication. 
Moreova, tbe grcatmt vdue of this mcthd lies in what it am 
tell us about tbm normal body p r m  whmt invcstigption defies 
ordinary chemical methods. 
W e  know, for insma, that the body ccmtinudy requires 
food, that a meat varitty of f d s  must be caten, and that some arc 
"burned" in tht body and p d u m  heat. We have found out, by 
very d s d t  and painstaking qxriments, tht identity of a gcat 
many of the chanical compounds which are formed in the b d y  
from the food originaIly taken in, If we andyzc an organ at two 
Wcmt times, the analysis oftea does not how any apprd&le 
change, so that it is usually impod'ble to tJ1 what has bFea hap 
pening b&ven tbw two anal-, All of the ~ubtIe vitd proecsses 
csn be studied &tidy  d y  and in great detail by using tracers, 
for we can make one of the normal body awnpounds in a radio- 
active form, administer it, and then foUm the complete hit& 
of the ''lahlId'' mokdei. The awm of phmphants in tbe body 
has bcen t d  in great detail in, this fnshion. 
Thh methad h already shown &at many of the structures 
of the body, which had always bun cansided to be stable, are 
really chmging, hiking down aad rtbuifding, at great ratm of 
speed. These an now be WPM, and it is fair in my that 
he methad gives ua a wbolly & conception of M y  and 4 
P- Such a d o n  of our basic id= leads in turn to chm* - 
interpretations of heal& d ,'gmtly a%c&g madicat 
prmie 
In plant biology, tht tracer mcthd has d d y  shown itself 
to be of gmat imporma. One of the most d i n g  and important 
probltms of science is 'How do planes manufacture ~ugar out of 
arbon dioxide, water, and sunligbt ?" If man could d u p l i a  this 
proms of "photasynth* first in tbe laboratory and then on an 
i n d u d  scale, the b o u n t i h  of the carth might bc greatly 
mdtiplied. Tbe world's fuel and food suppLits would IR assurea 
aa long as the sun cmtinuw to cmit light. A most m f u l  tool ' 
st the d i s d  of the &&st sad MoIogh for undersmd'i and 
perhaps evcntudy duplidng photmynthcsis, is the tretctr, radio- 
active mlmn, which has b#n mtntimrad before. If, as a mult of 
our greatly i n m a d  production of radioactive carbon, the riddle 
of phtospnthesis is s o l d ,  that, and not p k r  plants or atomic 
bombs, d stund as the greatest: achievement of atomic tnetgy 
rile. 
8 n t a w y  
The moat sigdicnnt me of d d  r a d i d v c  materials 
will be in Iahratorp in d k h  the -g of atoms 
through their radiations wiU cnablt d e s t  adminoes to be made 
w h  very nature annot bq predictad at tbis b Just as the 
experiments of Fermi in 1934 Id, all un-y, to the produc- 
tion of the atomic b b  and orher atomic mew sourea in 1945, 
so dm finsl rtsults of such '%ad '  researcba and their Muenw 
on life even a few yam frmn now annot be adequatcry anticipated. 
But the t&t wilI be gmt. A condition for obtaining 
th- h e f i e ,  however, is an enlipbmtd attitude towards the 
ctmtrol and h of radio& materials and i n h t i o n  con- 
etrning the methods for using them. 
For tb of m~o~faauriag  radioactive oi 
h using pilc ~~, it is not to have piles which - 
supply iadusM pwper. Elm incapable of ddi* useful: powtr 
m sfl supply r r d e ~ u a t ~  1 m0011ts of radioactive ~~ to d1 - and ean a h  save as b u m  of gamma and neutron 
d a t i o a  fn order to simplify the probIem of internatid eon- 
a ~ l  of =- WFOPWIS, it may bt coasidered - todday fm 
a time the use of atomic power on r Iargc d e  since the power 
i d a t i o n s  may bc used to form quantities of hionable maaerial 
which a d d  be d in bombs. Even if this postponement w r s ,  
it will not be n- to delay at d the great bentfits derivable 
from the usc of radioactive materials. 
National legislation on atomic energy is needed for several ~ C ~ S O ~ I S .  
The development of peacetime applimtians of atomic power 
must be encouragtd. The prcsmt large investment of the pmpte 
of tbe United States must be protected against the exploitation of 
my sm&r group. 
Proper safeguards must be pxovided against the m i m e  of 
atomic explosives, and against the hazards to health which may 
arise during the course of research apd development work. 
To assure proper development of the whole of the atpmic 
energ field, government assistance and when necessary direct 
spom&p are needed. 
A mechanism must be provided so that military applications 
can bt tfftetivdy stopped or effiaeritly continued, depending on 
whcthu or-not a satisfactory agreement on world-wide control of 
atomic weapons is reached. 
These four aims urnnot be achieved without a certain degree 
of government interferenoe with the freedom of private research 
and devdopmtnt in the nuclear field. The legidation must bF SO 
devised as to reduce this intcrfertnce to the minimum neccr;sary to 
attain these aims. Atomic power must not become a Iever for the 
intrduction into administrative practice of irresponsible and die 
tatorial methods, or for putting hrge segments of scientific mearch 
into a strait-jacket of military m r i t y  regulations. 
It semrs to be the cons tns~~  of opbion among the d y l t i s ~  
who worked on the atomic bomb that production and distribution of 
fissionable materials must bc made a government monopoly. This 
will automatically put into the hands of the g ~ ~ e r n m ~ n t  co - 
d over the radioactive materials obtained as by-products in the 
fabrication of atomic explosivc~ or production of atomic powcr. 
Obviously, gmne new agency must bF created to mke eare of 
the governmeat monopoly of hionable and ardficalfy radioactive 
rnateri&. Because of the wide national and international. impli- 
ations of the operations 3 this agency, it must be crcatad on the 
highest l e d  and should not be subordinated to any of the existing 
government departmenb. Policy decisions must be entrusted to 
fuU-time oflidals, appoiatd by the President, confirmed by the 
Senate, and fully responsible to them. The carrying out of h e  
decisions must be given into the bands of administrators of proper 
mhnid  qualifications. Because of the fundamend di&rtnees 
bttwcen the sevcrd administrative to be performed, it does 
not secm dvisSbIe to appoint a single administrator. 
The policy-making authority might best bt vested in a cam- 
mission. Such a d n  might contain several cabmet manha 
in addition to spadally appointed full-time members. The com- 
miaionm must be of the highest d b c r  both in their statcamanship 
stad in the capadtp for appreciating the &tifie and technological 
aspem of atomic energy. 
The administrative tasks to bt performed under the Atomic 
Energy Commisgioncrs wilI include the following: 
I. D i d o n  of p v c r n m e n t - o d  nuclear r d  labora- 
torits (such as the present Cfiton and Chicago laboratories). This 
task must be placed in the hands of a highly qualified scientist1 
2. Support of none-taf stsearch in the nuclear field 
by grants-in-aid. 
3. Production of hionable material- task which wil l  
include the d i d o n  of large production plants such as thm at 
Hanford and Oak Ridge, unless international agreements raquirt 
the cesation of h g e s d e  production. This task must bt placed 
in the bands of a q d e d  produedon expert. 
4. Equitable allmation of fissionable and r a d i d v t  mate 
tiah to gwemmctltrrl and non~wrmrrend research and develop 
ment laboramria, 
5. Inspection of laboratories and plma wbich use hionable 
or radioactive materials, to protect people from the dangers of 
expldon or radiation damage. 
6. Dtvtlopmcnt and production of atomic weapons unlcss 
they hive been made ill& by international agreement, This will 
involve the direction of a laboratory or iaboratories of h e  type of 
that existing at Los Alama. 
T h t  military division probably would optrate under the 
security regulations usually appfid to ordnance development. Be- 
pwd this it is daubtfuI whcthtr tk d o n  nee& to bt em- 
powered to h e  any - regulatiolys appliabh to the work ia 
tbe g w e m E a l  hhrab rh  or private d using govtm- 
"I 
uunt-owd or govtmmtnt-supplied fmi& or d i o a d v t  
mataid% 
If tbe atomic armaments. race is texminakd by international 
con- any regulations in the field of nudear m e a d  
will obviously be unneccasarp. But even while thii race is in pro& 
nss, aecmcy rtguIatiw may do -re hnrrm than good. The 
quwrtion must be asked: Can we expect a better guarantee of our 
eonthud Ieadmhip in the field of atomic -ts fr& m- 
psrrmentatim of ncitnec under military m r i t y  regulations or 
from fxac raitarch under the traditional anditions of f r a  EX- 
change of i h ,  and information bttween dl scicntis~? If the 
fatter is tht case, thm not only should there k no attmpt to inter- I 
ftre with the M o m  of publiation of all regults o b t d d  by 
mearch in universities and other private laboratorb, but a policy 
of fa pubIimtion should k adopted for the gctwrammtal 
rtsearch laboramria as d. 
The mvernment mcwopoly of M&le and radioactive 
materids may put into tbc hands of Atomic Energy Commie 
sion over private dand development. It should be 
sptcitied whether this powct may be used to influence ihc pt&g 
and diraaion of nudear research outside tbc gowrnm~ltal abra- 
toriw, or whether it b u l d  only be used to m a h d n  necessary 
stakpifc6 of critical rnatcrids, to pment their ~ s u s e ,  'and to en- 
force regulatiom for health protection. 
~aaib;r;tics must be provided for appcal from decisions on 
dmatirm of mattrids undcr .he  mml of the mnmkion. 
LcggJ. prodons for the docation of fissionable materids for 
power production otbm than for aperhntd  p- must be 
-' I 
I 
b a d  on two cons idcrab:  
(1 ) achievement of maximum g m d  for the nation as a whole. 
(2 )  avoidance of such devtlopmmm as may makc more difli- 
cult the initiation and operation of in&rnationd eon& 
over atomic -. 
The acbond eonaideration may & ad-h a pwp011-t 
of s@ic legislation on i n d d  use of atomic power until llfbtr 
the full UKplOmtion of tbt problem of internatid COIltroIa 
I 
t The Smehue of' the Atom* A11 matter is composed of atom. I n d d ,  matter consists of mthing but atom, and there arc incxedibk numbers of than. A spoonful of water contains a million billion billion atoms, The hid idea of the atom pictured it as a d i d  and indi- 
visible particle. In h, the word atom means tbat which cannot 
be divided. About the kginning of this umtury deuce discovered 
that thm atoms were divisible, that they were c o m p d  of smaller 
parts. 1n 1910 the great British physicist h r d  Rutherford showed 
that every atom cwsists of a small podtidy charged nucleus sur- 
rounded, like a central sun, by a negatively .charged planetary 
+tm The planets of this atomic solar system were named tie- 
trom, and & electron is a particle of negative elcaricity. 
It was found that the numbcr of elcct~ons revolving around 
the nucleus is equal to the number of cbargts of positive elmicity 
that are mrrid by the nucleus. Tbw, the nucleus of the hydrogen 
atom has one unit of positive e h a r w d  it has one rtvdviag 
electron. Uranium, the baviwt naturdy occurring type of atom, 
has 92 u n i ~  of positive charge, and WE find that its nudeus is sur- 
rounded by 92 revolving dtctrons. Betwc~n these m o  atr- 
hydrogen the lightweight and uranium tbt havyweight-m dl 
9 c  various combinations of positive and negative charges which 
exist in nature and wbich constit~tt the varittics of atoms, or 
Thus, to sum up our picture, we have found that amma con- 
sist of nudci and e l m  The n d m  is the d p t  center, 
which m& dmaat all the atom's mass or weight. The electrons 
arc the &&dy -tin partidce which revdw around the 
nucleua, much as the planeta &ve around the sun. It is the 
number of e I w  in an atom that govcras the chatlid prop- - 
* A n ~ l o b a # ~ t r f n d u d d m m ~ ~ m t h d d ~ ~  
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eruts of the atom. The e l m %  for w p l c ,  determine that one 
zitom of oxygen wiU unite with two atam of h y d r o p  to form the 
mdecular pattern, H,O, of watEr. Most substanew on earth exist 
not as dements but as compounds, the d ~ i t  of whose particles, 
the ~lzofeculc, consists of a group of anywhere from two to a few 
thousand atoms. 
Dwpite the coneenuation of p r x t i d y  all the atomic m m  
in the nudeus, the latter is very minute. The atom itself is quite 
small. The orbit of its outernost deetron is hardly a hundred 
millionth of an inch in diameter, while the diameter of the nudeus 
is we hundred thousandth the atomic diameter, If the nucleus 
could be magnified to the size of a baseball, the outermost electron 
would be almmt hdf  a mile away. Therefore, even when atoms 
arc packed tightty together (as they are in solids), the nuclei 
d n  fa t apart, On the magnified d e  mentioned before, nuclei 
the size of k b a I l s  wodd be about a mile apart. 
h l k d k u , n # n * l *  
w w w r r n m - n  
n t * ~ m o M w W a n r  
Whire the modern theory of atomic chemistry was being 
deveIoped, physicists went on to cxp10re the atomic nucleus and 
found that it too ww composad of d e r  partar. T o  bt su*, ia 
the one a& of hydrqgen, that lightest of the atoms, the nudeus 
was found to consist of a single partid-but in all the. otbtr 
oinety-ont d e m e n ~  the nucleus was i d f  a w m b i i o n  of par- 
tide. Experiments rcvded that these particles of which the 
nudeus is built were of two khds--#rotow and rcutrow. 
In mass or weight protons and neutrom arc abut  equd, but 
in electrical properties they are quite different. The proton is 
e t i v d y  charged, and the number of d t i v t  charge in the 
nudeus is equal to the number of protons contained:Thus hydra- 
gcn, with its one positive charge, has one proton. Urdum, with 
92 poaitive c h g a ,  has 92 protoas. 
The neutron, on the other hand, car& no charge at all- 
is clectridy neutral, hma its name. But it weighs approxhtdy 
~ s a m e ~ ~ p m t o a A t O m i c w d & t i s t h e s u m d h n ~  ' 
of protons and neutrons mmkd in the nudtus, h t c  the ' -, 
although p m t  in cquaI number to the protons, are very mueb 
l i t e r  than either piotons or aautroas and so mm'bure litdc to 
ttre weight. The oxygen we breathe bas a nuclear structure rmrde 
up of 8 protons md usually 8 mum-d ita weight thmeh~t 
is 16, Urmium-tht kind 4 in mnting the bombhas  92 pro- 
cons id 143 ncutrom, giving it an awmic weight of 235, 
- 
The m u m  and protom within aa a t d c  nucIcus are held 
together by thu most powerfd f w  known, RcmwImbIy Etdc is 
understad of these ndcar forw, tvcn after many YESUS of re- 
star&. W e  do how that they arc m d p  smq-mrc than 
a million times stronger than the & d c d  forces which hold 
mygen and h y d r w  togtther in the water molecule, while these 
c h d  forcm in nun are many timas str- h rhe &tic 
form which hold together a lump of steel. I t  is for d& reason 
&at the n u h  is ampletely unshed during most of the atom% 
activities. An a m  of carbon in a Iump of d map combine with 
oxygen ("burn") to fWPl wbw dioxide gaa, without a&ting 
the n d e m  in the &ghwt. 
&r*clgfid with the ucmendous strength of these nudear 
fosws in comparison with &anid forerri (x'.k, f o r a ~  
atoms), c n d y  greater amounm of enem are r e l d  in 
nuclear r d n s  than in any chemical reaction. For example, in 
n&r h i o n  (rht prmma which makm an atomic potRer plant 
work), me p o d  of uranium products 11,400,000 k i l o w a ~ ~  ' of energy, whereas one pound of  ma^ will r ~ s s c  only b t  om
rhrecmillionth sls much. 
In popular hnguage, any a d e m  P- or d o n ,  suJi as 
C the Q K I ~  usad in the atomic M, is dkd "splitting the a m "  "Splitting an atom" d a  not refer to dividing a nudeu into i~ protons and mtrom. UsEly, it refers to tbc dtmmatim of 
om kind of nu&w into a n o h .  Some dunenb found in nature 
condnuody and tapmtancoudy transform into other elements, a 
p- d d  r a d i d v e  b y .  R d m  is a wtll known -It. 
The rate of this process a n n o t  be &mod by m y  u r t e r d  m d i -  
ti-; each type of atom disint-atcs at i~ own $pacific rate re- 
g a t h  of any outside influtnas. The rate varies widely from one 
substance to d r ;  the gas actinon disappears in a few seconds, 
whereas radium lash thousands of years. In each such transforms- 
tion, ram are given off from the ~acrbrrs, known = alpha, bEta and 
gamma rays Alpha rays axe bigh sptad particles, each constituting 
the nucleus of a helium a t m  Bcta rays arc high ,meed dcctrons. 
Gamma rap rue very high eaergy radiation eimilar to x-rays. 
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It is also possible & d l y  to make naturally stable atoms 
undergo nudear tramformatiom It is not to mgLt a nucleus 
react. Conditions which an ordinarily ~ U S C  chemical reactions, 
such as high temperawcs, or trtatmmt with strong acids, bsvc 
no tfita upon a nudeus. But, nuclear transformations can bc 
initiated by h b d i n g  s nucleus with m e  form of minute pr+ 
j d c  of about the same dze as tbe nucleus or smaller. Protons have 
bttn d, but since the proton carries a p i t i v e  charge, and &a 
the nudew of cvuy atom is aba mitidy charged, the nudew 
m d s  to repel m y  proton moving toward it.* Thus only by 
adtxathg the protons to very high velocitia can traasmutations 
bc occdodly  produd. 
The neutron wu discovered in 1932, and proved to k an 
ideal project& for transmutation: hcc it carrim no electrical 
cbargc, it is- not subject to foras of xepddm. Shct neutrom nor- 
d y  form parts of nuclei, and m not gcacrally found free, thcy 
can not be used for b a m h d m ~ ~ ~ t  until they art liberated from their 
parent nuclei by other nudeax rtsEtions. 
~ ~ O d t b - k W ~ d d h a .  
Several hundrad difEtrent w a n s b f i o a p  of nuelti in- 
veai&tdd in the 1930's. None of than gave my proQliae for * 
reItasb of nudear enem on a hrge dt. Still, a v a y  Iarge num- 
bet of these transformahxu resulted in the formation of new 
of atams which were themselvm radioactive, and liicE the natural 
radioactive subs- mentioned above, emitted alpha, beta and 
gunma rays during thcir radioactive d ~ ~ t i o n .  One further 
rault was mmmn to dl t k  d u a l  tramformatioris: when 
the bombarded nudeus broke into two fragmcna one of than m 
nearly $ways very d, while the other consisted of dI tbat re 
m a i d  of the original nuclew This add M y  bc d a d  atom 
splitting, 
But in 1938 schtists h t  b aware that a heavy n d m  
could be split into slmost equal park  It was found that when a 
neutron hit the nucleus of uraaium-235, the nuelclrs scparawd 
into two fragments, oac weighing abut 100, the othcr h u t  135. 
This is srrclem fisn'on, the pmem which msde possible the MC 
h b .  
Immediately after the dimvery of thia p r m  physicha 
d d a r e d  the smount of encrn free by &on. This energg is 
several d i o n  time larger thsln the energy rcl& in my c h 4  
reaction involving the same amount of material. Of course, the 
to& amount of energy rtleastd by a &gIe a m  is very d, but 
if the energy in dl atam of a pound of udum-235 were r e k c d ,  
the eaergy produd would fe quidmt to the cxploaion of 
5,OM),oOo p!nmds of TNT. 
SUMMARY 
1. Thc nuclei of atam in a d i d  arc very far apart dative 
to &tir s k  
2. Many of atomic nuclei spontaneously undergu disin- ' 
wgmtion with the release of various radiations, Such nuclei are 
termed "mdioactivc." 
3. Neutrons are constituents of nearly all nuclei, a d  when 
tiberatad may bc used to h b a r d  other nuclei. 
4- Nearly dl the elements hown to man have been tram 
muted by bombardment with n , . n e  product nuclei are 
often radioactive. I MI 
5+ The number of protons in its nucleus determines the ele- 
ment to whl& an atom bdongs, while the atomic weight is the 
rmm of the number of protons and m~trom in the nucteus. Thus, 
an atom with 92 pro#ma is d c d  an atom of "uraaium." If in 
addition to this numlxr of protons, the nucleus contains 143 
neutrons, the atomic weight h 235. This atom is hewn as 
"uranium-235.1' 
6. The ene~gy released in the fission reaction of all the. 
nuclei in a lumj~ of material is much Iarger tbatl the energy re- 
I d  in the mmplctc &emid itaction of the s a m e  amount of 
maarid. For exampIe, it would be possible to keep a single 300- 
watt bulb burning for a day, with the h i o n  energy of a few mil- 
lionths of an o u m  of uranium-235, whereas it wodd toquire the 
burning of over a pound of petroleum to do the same. 
7. Because the atom is so wry small, the amount of energy 
involved in the reaction of one nudeus is minute. It is only when 
many nu& undergo transformation almost simultanmusly that 
the rate of energy r c l e  kotnm W~UL Considering the example 
uacd bcforc, the energy for burning a 3Wwatt bdb for a day could 
bt secured from the h i o n  of 1,000,000,000,000,000,000 (a billion 
billion) uranium-235 nuclei; despite the large n u m k  of atoms 
hvolvcd the totd weight is only a few millionths of m ouunoc. 
How the-At& Bomb WorW 
The action of the atomic bomb is based upon the phwamenon of 
nudear fission. Nuelcar h i o n  is a spacial kind of atomic nuclear 
remian, which has made it m i b l c  to &aee nudear enem on a 
large scale. Two materials, urmium-235 and ph~tonium-239, CM 
be used for this p u m .  In the &on d o n ,  a neutron splits a 
n d e w  of a certain type of atom into two parts of a p p r h t e l y  
e q d  sim. In this proem an average of about two neutrons arc 
given off, as w d  as large mountp of energg. 
The key to the importance of fission in making the production 
of atomic energy practical is the generation of a d d i t i d  neutrons 
in the fission whicb makw poseibh r cbsh reaction. A t d c  
energy could not be r e l d  in any practical fashion if all the 
neutrons to caw had to be fumkhd from the outside. The 
&in reaction acts as an i n t t rd  source of neutrons- 
A chin d o n  is one in which tht p d u c t  of a siagte 
reaction starts another similar -tion, which then starts mother 
one, e t ~  A f d i a r  example of a chain of this sort is the chain 
b, in which the recipient of a Ictter is ask4 to write a s h h  
lttttr to 0th mple. If each person in the chin writw a single 
such letter, the chain may carry on inddnitdy at the same 
This we may dl a "simple" chain reaction. If each perawn racdv- 
ing a &in latter mds out several more, instead of just one, eaeh 
succeeding link of the chain'takm in larger and larger numbers 
of people. This is &led a "divergent*' or branched &ah, and is 
characteristic of mpladn reactions. It is the type of ch in  d o n  
which t a b  p h  in tbe atomic bomb. The neutrons r d d  in one 
hion ahoot out, and, striking other h i p d l t  nu& g i v ~  mom 
%om, which liberate more neutroas, and sa forth. The number 
of neuuoas released being more than the one needed to continua 
a simple chain r e a c h ,  we have a divergent chain. 
l'he continuity of such a chain will be b r o k  u d s  rbt neu- 
trons d e a d  by a fission rclset with another bionabIt nucleus 
bcfom they a n  mpe from the lumi af materid. AIthugh the 
atom making up a lump of uranium-235**, for txample, are 
crowdtd together, the nu& of thc atmu are relatively far apart, 
h u s e  they are scr much smallez &an the atoms. And since the 
atom b m d y  empty spaa, a ncutroa, which is m d t r  than a 
nu&, may sail through many atwng befort hitting a nucleus. It 
k nccmary, therefore, to haw a sufficiently large n& of nuclei 
in the lump of uranium-235 to make surt that a b u g h  the neutron 
missa mmt of them, it will have a good chance of h d y  colIiding 
and d g  with one of &em. 
If the lump is mall, so many neutrons wiU pasis through it 
without bitting a nucleus and will thus m p  into the air, that 
the chain will be brakm and atomic mcrgy in wadad amounts 
wifl not be rtl-d. If the lump is large enough sa that the chain 
will continueI the mat amount of energy produd  in the many 
hi01is oceufritg bacomwr great enough to be d. Thm is a 
criticat amount of material, Mow which the chaiu will not'con- 
thue (and a h  whicb it will), which is called the %itid size." 
Thus, a pica of uranium-235 the size of a grape cannot suppwt a 
chain d o n ,  whtrcas a piece the size of a volleyball will support 
a c b n .  Thc mitical size lias -here in bctwecn. 
A div-t chain rtaction in a lump of uranium-235 l i b -  
a great deal of energy in r very short time. This energy rtleasc 
d m  in a tmncndoua mladon of far greater magnitude than an 
orditrary TNT txplmiau. 
An explosion, as we how, is a sudden and violent expansion 
brought about by release of a l a r s  mount of energy in a s m d  
region, The mergy of a mmmon explosive (like TNT) is released 
as beat which coma from the rapid &mid reaction which taks 
plaek Tk temperature reached may be 5000° Centigrade, which 
is comparable to the temperature on the surface of the sun. 
Because of the tremendous amount of heat I h t e d ,  the 
explosive forms a m m  of m d y  hot p. A at such r bigh 
temperature normally occupies many thousand ti- as much space 
aw the cold solids from which it is formad. Thus tbe hot p formed 
by tbe rapid liberation of heat expands very mpidly to try to uxupy 
its normal volume. If the heat is Iiberakd fast enough, the hot p~ 
will bt f o d  and wiU expand so rapidly that ib pressure will 
smash anything that gcts in its way. 
Thus we see that the force of an explasim depends on two 
things: the amount of energy that is i s d ,  and the speed with 
which tbat energy is released. The slow burning of a mountain of 
coal give a lot of merw, but the gas formed has a chancc to drift 
I 
away so that no exphion mcum If the mountain of caal could bc 
made to burn in a fraction of II seccmd, it would rmdt h an 
arp1oeion. 
Most of tbe t a c r g ~ r r e l d  i n a n a ~ c b o m b c h a i n ~  
(energy equivalent to 20,000 tom TNT) is in the form of heat, 
mdbecauscthetimtoftnergy~isso&ort ( a d  fraction 
of a d) thin concentrated heat raise the bomb to a tanpaam 
of millions of degrcq tbcreby c b g h g  its ma- and the sur- 
rounding atmagphere to a large m m  of hot glowing gae one-third 
milt across. The trancndous tmpcrature mults in thE emission 
of searing hest rays which burn everything in thtir path, while the 
hot push out in a devastating ~ l t p 1 h  wave. Durimg the ex- 
plosion, some of thc energy ie libembed & # ' ' ~ ~ 0 1 ~ ' '  
which are highly -rating x-rays, T h a  mya pcnemk h g h  
walls, m d  injure human badies so that ~ ' v o r s  of the k t  oad 
~ l o s i v t  blast may die Iam fmm dmqp to the blood farming 
tissue, 
The problem of an cxpldon in s definite place, with- ' a d - m t h e c P n * r o f t h c ~ L d n d b h . v i ~ d t h r  
"' 'a 
bionablc material in the form of lurnm d t r  than the critical 
size. Thus, if thcrc arc two Iumps of uranium235 crrch d e r  
than the critical size (but when combined, greater than the aitid 
size), and if these two lumps are rapidly brought together, a fast 
divergent chain r d o n  follows, culminating in a explodon. 0- 
the mo piem camt together, the exphion cannot be stoppad. 
Furthtrmore, a amallex cxplaeion cannot be obtained by using ltss 
uranium-235, for if tw little material i md (i.e., ltss tban the 
cr i t id  amount) then will be no expldon at all. A piece of 
uranium-235 the size of a marble cannot be made to explode. 
The hionable material in aa atomic bomb will not expLode 
until tht piaces have bten brought together by the detonating 
mcchaninm. The particular mechanism we used is one of the tech- 
n i d  "-" of the bomb. 
It is quite evident that the only way to influence the exphion 
of a bomb is by an attack on the detonating mechanism ibelf, either 
setting it off prcmaturtly, or "jmmhg" it. 
One method we know for producing &cts at a ddistanct is 
by r d b  waves. But unless the detonating mechanism is itself 
optrated by such mvw,  we can neither "jam" it nor explode it by 
my kind of radio wave Even in the ease that a particular detonator 
is swsitive to radio waves it is newsary to know tbe exact nature 
of tbe machaniam before the prow radio s i g d  for setting it off 
GUI be known. It can bt seen from this dkwion of the bomb and 
its detonation that no general method of either "prc-cxploding" or 
"jammi& atomic bombs b pwsible. 
Plutonium Manufadwa - The Chah 
R€tUctiop 'me8'* 
During the development of the fast neutron chain d o n  
d in the atomic bomb, it was found h t  a controlled ('SimpIe") 
chain readon wuld be u t % d  for tht production of one of the 
hionable matetiads, plutonium-239. This article considers the 
aatuxe of this mdd chain W o n .  . 
The d i i i o n  of the &ion chain -action in the preceding 
article considered a 'lump of pure uranium-235 (or plutonium- 
239) which is large enough so that nwt  of tbe neutro,p hit a 
ndtua of uranium-235 before they could e~eape out into the air. 
Suppose this lump had mixed within it some other Ends of nuclei, 
which do not Won when hit by neutrons; but which capture the 
neutrons, Colpture of neutrons is a type of nuclear reaction too, but, 
the product d ~ c s  not give oif any neutrons. As far as the chain 
d o n  is m d ,  to lose a neutron in this way is just as bad 
as to a mtma because it escaws into the air. If the amount 
of sueh absorption is grmt e n d ,  it may break the chain, and 
tbw prevent the release of large amounts of nuclear enmu. 
Uranium-235 is not found pure in nature. It is mixed with 
another kind af urdum, uranium-238, from which it is wry diffi- 
d t  to separate. ln fact, this country spent over a billion dollars 
to build plants just to makc this separation. The mixture of &a 
two which is found in name is d e d  natural uranium. Udike 
uranium-235, uranium-238 wilI not h i o n  whentvtr a neutron 
hits and m t c ~  with i t  When any but the f-t neutrons react 
with a nucleus of uranim-238, the neutron is u s d l y  captured. 
It happens that uranium-238 is the more abundant of the two 
kids of uranium atom; natural uranium consisb of more than 
99% uranium-238 and l a  than 1 % of uranium-235. A chain 
reaction cannot progress in a lump of natural uranium since if a 
chain started, it would soon be broken by the capture of neutrons 
by the uranim238. 
Two me&& enabling the ute of uranium in a chain m- 
tion have bcea dcvelaped. One of them is to =parate the uranium- 
235 from the uranium-238, which ia done w is desaibed in the 
article "Separation of the Imtom of Uranium" The othcr mctbod 
is to use 1- of natural uranium spaced at intervals in a large 
graphite* structure d e d  a "pile." As iontramd to tbe divergent -
* w a r ~ r b l e h 8 m d b b k , b t t k ~ d m d t t o ~ ~ ~ d  
b a v r w ~ b e . ~ ~ . P & ~ "  
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club redm mIt ia& in an explosion, the pile 
chain r e a c h  which is conudhble. The atomic bomb b the m y i  b: 
A 
iw application of atomic cncrm; the pile ~EI the mmm through 
which atomic uwgy wiU bt w ~ t d  for peacctinae m~ 
The pile mka use of the fa h t  the ~~ of B ncu- I 1 .  wen in reacting a Irid nudew (either to awe 
G o n  or to be apmrcd) map depcnd verp makcdly u r n  the 
I speed with which tht neutron is moving. (The anrtr~m which are emitted during a i%sion move at about 10,000 miles per m a d . )  
At bigh neutron w s  the durn-238 mpn\rts a v ~ y  high
gmcm~age of tht neutrons. It is for this reason that a &ah icac- 
tion cannot occur in pun rra& uranium h c e  the chain is broloea 
by m v a l  of too nnrtrons by the U-238. It sa happeas, 
However, thst if the neurons are slowed down r great to a 
sped of about oat mile per second, the reactivity of the uranium- 
235 nudeus bmmm much greater than that of r urariium-238 
d e u s ,  d a 1-r percent- of the neutrons cause fission in the 
uranium-235, thus cnabfhg a chain reaction to occur. 
T o  @ a chain reaction with natural uranium in a "pile" rhc 
urdum lumps mu& be dnmall enough so that most of the fast neu- 
trons liberated in h i o n  mn &cape from the uxdum lump without 
bCipg absorbtd by the uranium-238 nuclei. Then, these n e u m  
must somehaw be slowed down until heir speeds are araund one 
milt per second, after which they may m t e r  the uranium lump 
md rcact itadiry witb the udlun-235 nudai. . 
These d t i o r u r  am met iu the following way ia the "pile!' 
The uranium lumps are placQd at regular intervals witbin a large 
strucrurc of graphite, Graphite b wmpod of atoms of mbq an 
dement w h a  lm very little rendmcy to &orb neumm. The 
neut~oas -ping from the udum Iumpe d i d e  with the nu& 
of the & atam a d  are grsrdualIy slowed d m ,  much as a 
billiard ?MU gets dowad down by the &as it mrmlra witb o,&cr 
balls on the table. Simx the carbon at- a b r b  very few neuuons, 
mt of t b ~  dogvad down n e ~ t -  evmmally b~uaee  bat%: into 
u d u m  lumps, where thcp. react kither with the wanillfn-235 or 
with the ~ u m - 2 3 8 .  B ~ u e  the uranium-238 nu&i rw far out- 
number tbc uranium-235 nuclei, n gcd many of the n t u m  are 
absorbed by the fomltr, but the grater r d v i t g  (at this slow 
n e u m  spaed) of the udum-235 eaablcs enough h i o m  m 
s3 
occur to carry on the cbain. The "piIc1' is  kept from korrming 
"divergent" by mtaas of a movable rod of mattrial containing 
baron or &urn, inserted in the pile, which is used to absorb the 
extra ncutrona and to keep the chain reaction running at a constant 
Ievd. This is called a "control rod." 
A uranium pile in whieh a chain reaction is going on has three 
important producb. First, tbe large number of &dm reactions 
forms radioactive atoms* and rcl- a large quantity of energy 
as heat, from which it may eventually be pmiile,' by suitable 
design, to get useful power. Second, a few days after a uranium- 
238 nucleus absorbs a neutron, the product of the reaction turns 
into a nudm of plutonium-239. Tt has been previously mentioned 
that pIutonium-239 is one of the nuclei which is known to be able 
to arty on a chain reaction. Plutonium-239 is much easier to 
separate from natural uranium than is uranium-235 kcaw it is 
chemidy  different from uranium. Fdowing &mid separation, 
the plutonium can be used as bomb m a t d .  
The plants at Hmford, Washington, contain large chain- 
rm'ng gts of -urn and graphite. The large amount of heat 
produced is not used to gcncrah pswtr, but is wasted by being 
m o v e d  in the flow of cooliag water from the Columbia River, 
The p r h q  purpose of these b is to make the GonabIe 
m a t e d  plutonium-239. Shodd plants be built in the future for 
the purpose of generating largE amounb of power, they could 
still be making comiderab1e quantitk of hionable material as a 
by&- 
I I 
S i e ~ O f ~ ~ o b U ~ '  
Uranium, as found in aanur, b a mixmm of severd of 
u d u m  having very similar &mid p r o d c s .  Thty are a6 
much alike in their behavior &d other &maid s& &at 
tk arc daastd together as a single claamend lplahrial anit they 
am rekrrcd b as the Isotopa of uranium. 
Thea#btopcodif&rindwap;forexampIe,theyha~e 
Merent weights. Uranium d o p e e  with weights 235 md 238 
units are found in the natural &re. 
L 
'I- It was fd early in the history of the developma~t of the atomic h b  that uranium-235 dSem tadidly from urm'um-238 in i& behavior tappard do* neutrons. Uranium-US is caprrMt, 
when struck by a neutron, of splitting into two parts and in so 5 doing it emib other nqutrons and trmtdom amounts of energy. Tbc o h  neutrons awe additional h iom of manium-235 atorms 
and so the process gmm with expldve PioIeuce. Urn-um-238 
Wave quite diB-tIy a d  when mixed with the hranium-235 
inhibits the &in reach.  
c The natural urm*um is about 99 pa cent U Y ~ * U B F ~ ~ ~  and 
it is neamry to -act tbe d amouut (1- than 1%) of 
uranium-235 in this mktwc in a dativety purt form in order to 
build bomb from it, This separation L r very difficult procedure 
and requires the use of very d v e  c~uipment. The cost of the 
p h t s  at Oak Ridge, Tuurmsec, was about a man d d b .  The 
rtason for tbis may bmt bE mn by masidering thc m*ow mcthads 
that have bacn shown to be usnfd for 1 a r g e - d ~  separation of tbe 
uranium isotopa for the pumm of producing bombs. 
In th cases of ordinary m h u m  of d$hnt &emid sub 
a variety of relatively simple metbods for their -tion 
I L X ~  available. For instance, in tbe case of pttrolcum, a fractiond 
distillation is mf3iCim.t to remove gasoline from the mixturn 14 the 
asc of tbe btom of u d u m ,  hmevcr, the previously merrtiom,d 
similarity of p r o m  p m t s  d&g the separation in this, man- 
nar. The four s c h a d c  diagram depict the metha& which haw 
h shown to b &able to the -tion of the d u r n  
isotopa. - "I: 1:; 
* & U b d e ~ ~ h ~ ~ ~ X I V a t t k p d a f ~ b O D t  
GIXS~ONS diffusion. The uranium in the form of a gaseous 
compound is allowed to difiusc through a sheet of porous martrid 
(a h i e r  ) . The uranium235 paaots through slightly more readily 
than the uranium238 since the heavier a gas particle (mdecde), 
the more slowly it d i k .  However, ddy a very small alteration 
in uranium-235 content is produced by each passap, since the . 
weigh b are so nearly the same, Consequently, the process must be 
repeatad thousands of timcs to obtain pure uranium-235, and very 
e x h i v e  plants arc rcquirad far the large w I e  production: 
Thermal diffusion. Uranium in the form of a liquid com- 
pound is placed between a hot surface and a cold surfae. The 
heavier uranium438 molecuIts move toward the cold surface and 
the uranium-235 towar& the hot. Due to the convection currents 
the uranium-235 gem mrried to the top of the apqaratus and the 
uranium-238 to the bottom. Here again the separation is s m d  and 
must be rtptattd many hes. 
Cantdfugdion. In this case, the same principle opera- that 
enables the separation of aeam from milk in the ercam -tor. 
Uranium in thc form of a -us compound is passed into a 
rapidly rotating vascl. The heavier uranium-238 is thrown preitr- 
mtially ta thc outer wall and a material enriched in uranium-235 
is withdrawn from the anter of the rotating v d .  The difference 
in the rats at which the uranium move to the outer wall 
is very small and cmqucntly the must be passed through 
many such centrifuges before pure uranium-235 ia obtained. 
Elecirornup~erie separation. Molaculcs containing uranium 
are charged d h c a l l y  and shot between the poles of aa dwtro- 
magnet. These electrically charged molecule (ions) are deflected 
into circular paths by the magnet. The heavier w d d 8  ions 
are I a s  d y  d e f l d  than the helighter iom and thus, by p k h g  
dectors in the proper &tion, one may obtain the udum-235. 
Tk d d  produaes a very m p l c t e  semthn af the uranium- 
235 but onIy a very d ounount of marcrid a n  be W e d  by 
a single gtpAator. ~~onscqucntly in this case a h  very cxtensivc 
equipment is required for l a r d e  production. 
! ~ ~ t o m t t h c b a r i c t m i t d m t t t r  
in chemical reaetiomr; no 
r d e r  amount d mabstatlfe 
takm part in any chrmic*l re- 
action. The ntrtruehrrt of the 
atom i m  l ib  that of tb mIar 
apkm in that then i a  a heavy 
0 d a 8  8d0m~l t0 h ntn, 
with tltchno rotating @but it 
in orb111 an various heavenly 
bodica like tlw earth rotate 
abwt the n u  
& mmhm the number of 
podtive charge8 (nee protoam, 
dohitiom 59) on the nuclew of 
the atom. Thin determiner the 
EbrmiEal nature of the atom. 
Atomic nambct 2 k helium, I3 
i a  aluminum, 29 31 copper, 92 
ir aranlum, e k  
G M -  thawtlghtof 
the atom is d8tadmed 
entirely bp ble we t of the 
nuelrun rmcc the in 
the arbitn arc 
!T 
nratiyely 
t i very very l i & ~  T h e  w x k '  
nearly equal to ibe tetrl lum~- 
bcr of protonn d neutron# in 
the nudeua. The badc d t  of 
w&ht in *rmn of .WE& all 
atom are d e d e d  u one&- 
teenth the weigh of b am- 
mon oxygen atom, apptodmatt- 
Iy tlle waigbt of omc pmmn or 
one nuutroa. 
L b m  very. rapid B travellag alsterona P Y ~  o 
when atms of &u-rFtiveW 
cormponeat such as an alpha- 
particle. 
7. a mlachine for upa- 
rating the varioua uraniom mo- 
topea (we dofiaition 41) b d  
on the maarrpactrograph prin- 
ciple (act dtfinidoa 47). 
8. ChafnrrcPetbarare-them 
icml or nucltar, in whch the 
soerm or pardelca gemratad 
by the breakdown of the firrt 
atom or mleeult CaUBeE the 
breakdown of one or more ad- 
ditional atoms or moleculen 
whom reaction in turn cauaea 
other atom or m o l d e m  to d i  
Integrate. 
B. a proaeaa 
in d W  an atom in one rind 
of chdca1 ~ub~tance 
p l m o  with a similar amm in a 
ditfuent subntmce. Thim ex- 
chaage ia Uwnead by the rel- 
ative marm of tb tsro atom8 
of &a ram+ cl~mmt, and f o r m  
tbe bada of medmd~ of hotope 
aoparatIw and wmmtmdon. 
10, Ctmrd device for ob- 
~erving path of individwal ra- 
&tiom putielc,  Track b m d e  
vkii?e to cya beau* fog drop- 
Ietn are fad along the path 
of parklea 
11. rodrr rodm of neu- 
abmbing material (cadrmnm 
or boron ateel) used In n piIe 
(M de&Jdon 55) to mntrsl 
the ohr i  relaton m r aterdy 
tewl. 
I P . ~ . t a r m c o m m o m l y n w d  
for a d o  r radio- 
r&e material for loma h e  
und the ndioactivi@ hu re- 
d u d  iaelf to a desired level. 
la. (Geiger, alpha) : in- 
mttamcnt for d c t c w  and 
oounting individual radiation* 
such ar born partiel* alpha 
partielea, Ogmmr rap*, a 
14. - the minimom 
ammr of r given fimila (ate 
definition 28) moterial ( u r a -  
om-291 or pluduaF239, for 
armple) required for A mpon- 
tnneoar chlia reaction, 
lwr h n  ibis amounb b e  rate 
of esca e of nentrom through 
thr murPace of the mam im 
high to rtrult in a "ehPin rearr 
t i d  
1L nu&m appment 
target m a  of 8 nuclew which 
b andtrgohg bombadmat by 
nuclear pardeiy judged by (hc 
number of w m d t d  retdonn 
obrthed. An t b i ~  nppartllt area 
involves U l  fa&ru dQ 
determine w M t r  r d o n  
oecrum or not, it b uaumlly d i  
fermt from rraction to r e d o n .  
1L apparam~ used to 
give great mpeedm to charged 
pardelen by aatlctating hem 
re atedly. A ntmng mgtlttfc 
fieE keeps h e  p*rdelem ttarel- 
inp In an crpmdhg oimlar 
&th T b e ~ e  particlea are uwd L nudew bornbardmmtt erpcd- 
mcna 
17. wrmrt of 
aeuma-abnorbhg power of an 
impurw element In o pila. 
18. etparadon of 
undesirable radioactive uub- 
amnew from a d e J d  product ; 
e.g, IC #ration of fiwiom pmd- 
un ra&a&ideB from pIuto- 
ninm. 
1% nocleus of hcaw-hy- 
drogcn atom, uaed as I projet- 
tne in many bombardments 
mi& the ~yclowm. 
M. mtcrid d k b  h a  
beea mepanted by tbs p m c m  
of -d i&l6h  (ae deAtlldm 21). 
Specifically, mattrial or- bar 
paucd throa r b d e r  in the R barrier di don rparatfon 
m e w  for u r d m  iwtopm 
PI. -the mov#mcnt of mole- 
culer through a gaq liquid or 
rolid, dua to the natural motion 
of the m o l d e r  which i r 
fundon of thcb temperature. 
Tht higaor the temperature, the 
hisfisr tht rate of difilion. 
PP. the procew of 
spontancoua nncleu Ehm h 
w M  a beta particle, alpha 
p d q  or d o n a l l y  a pwi- 
tm (act dehition 57), i n  given 
off from dw nktenr, lea* 
the nudear with a different 
atomic number. 
49, the unit particle of 
negative el&ciq, weighlog 
about !/2000 aa much a1 a pro- 
ton. Electric current ir made up 
bf a atream of e1t~tt0na. 
Pd W v o B i  the unit of enerm 
n ~ d  in nudear science. Nuclear 
reactions n ~ u d l y  involve cner- 
gics of tbc order of miliiom of 
tisctron - w1t11 (abbrtviadon, 
Mev), while chemical reactions 
involve energin of only a few 
electron-volm. An electron-volt 
18 q u d  to &a energy of a dn- 
$It bpdrogtn atom traveling at 
about 550 f i iIt~ a minute. 
25. inntrumtnt  f o r  
measuring radiadon by mtanr 
of the ionization the latter pm- 
dllecll fn dr, tbil ionization act- 
Ing to didarga 8 ucondcnaer" 
made of m o  gold leavca or of 
mcnl-wnted qulrta fiben. 
96, flmbll.k a kind of matter which 
i~ not dcoormpostd by any Lfnd 
of cbemteat rsaahn; a Hnd of 
atom with a given atomic nnm- 
kt, en& a8 hydrogen, atad- 
nnm, imn, copper, brorrJlre, 
chlorine, uranium, ttc. 
H. khm i ratio of 
r a h ;  tho rado of mncentm- 
don of &en dcaired iwto e 
m that of the other iwto r s  Yn 
the #rodsct e m n  dhiLd  by 
the eorrmpondmg ratio tn ?be 
mittore i m p t  *para- 
don pracems are u d .  Thun, 
c p m d w  W% 0-295 from 
natural nradum ti140 U-235) d need* in m t r  1 carlchmmt 
Lax of 90/10 + 1/199 or about 
1m. 
Pk P b b  capable of 
cka~ab10. Used ~m 
 me^ of atom mmh r uranium, 
thorium, protactinium, a, 
which mrp undo* Gum 
H.-tba p-tbpwhidl 
the nucltum of an atom k sdit 
into nevtrnl path, at Ima iwo 
of which are of roughly compa- 
rable dze, grtnter than that of 
ahe alpha pardclt. The procem 
of frr~ton of hea .toma wn- 
~ v n  two Gter ttamr 
from the middle of the periodic 
table, togder with meveral 
ntutronr and much energy. Fie 
rlon cauaed by a very energetic 
neutron t ca1Itd u f ~ a t  &sion," 
a slow neumn, u~loPI" or 
%.m.I~. 6isdo.. 
a h s h d h  stt 'Timile? 
91. Flub pmdm an isotope (nee 
definition 41), umullty radio- 
active, of an element in the 
middle of the periodic table and 
produced b fission of I heavy 
element BUJI as uranium, 
proem of 
meparation of one or more m- 
ponenm of a mixture of rub- 
stancen with diLrmt boiling 
pohb by careful boiling OE of 
only pan of the mixture. Prop- 
erly done, rubstawa may be 
fairly demty separated from 
each 0 t h .  
i 38. penetrating invia- 
I iblc light-like radiation given off from the nucieoa of an atom 
wben ucrcittd'' Uanally more 1 penetrating than ordinary -rap, which originate oatdde 
of the n d e m  
M, Hdf-Wz thc length of time it 
t.Ln a ~amplc of radioactive 
isotope C dccrtaw to half of 
i t o  or@nal amomt by radioac- 
tive didnttaration. The number 
i n  a p p i c a l  constnnt character- 
i~tic o the hotope, and indr 
pendent  o f  the pnrticular 
amount origindl prelent, and 
of exttrnm~ Eclndftiona nu* *a 
temperature, pmaure, etc 
35. m n d  dement ia peri- 
odic tabla; nucltum im 'alpha 
rmtrn water in whfch 
mgm of the HsO ia 
of tha he.w i l q o ~ p e  
of caned dclttenum, 
with M1L number 2. (See d&- 
nition 46) Wxhien D&. *. Holkrgll taw u d  tn dwribe 
tha of valoabla m a t e  
r ip l t iaUpiQp-  
W. lam an rtom or~lccols  whieh 
mrrier an ch.rgc. 
S k  h&uBm h m m e n t  
for mtarur£q dinetly the 
e t  of ioluarttim radma& 
tivie prodnesm in air, or other 
P* 
40. l d m w  in ndear  h, two 
atoms w i h  di%eront s todc  
number but whk tht name may 
number, For example, cmdrm- 
urn-113 and hdium-113; nep- 
tunium-239 m d  plutonium-239. 
41. atoms of a given el* 
ment which have different n u a  
bem of neutrons in the nucleus 
and therefort differ in marl or 
weight 
a ddCC for eIc~trom8g- 
netie ~eparation of Isotopea in 
which Le ion mum Is of large 
area, rather than n dit sa in 
the usual mam ~pectograph. 
43. LaMcm tbe geometrical arrange- 
ment of the arlnium or plum- 
nium rodm in a piIc. 
U. apparatus for e l m  
trommgnetic separation of un- 
ninm iwtclpta (not actunlly 
a d  in U-235 produetlw). 
46. eEcctively the asme in 
weight 
18. t&a & the number of 
particfca (proton* and nti- 
trmm) in a given nncIe~a; a 
prorimatdy the weight of & 
nucleus. 
~ W U ~ C B ~  
for  lorbag out and reghering 
the mawa of a tom mnd light 
moIecn1ea 3% is nude pop 
~ible  bcenusc the path of an ion 
in P magnede add im wmtd. 
Particles of different mimes 
travel curved patha of dlghtly 
di&rmc radii. 
40. matcrial mntaining 
amam of low atomic weight; 
u d  in pile for dowing d m  
Dttttrom by ~olliriw. Heavy 
hydrogen, beryllium, a d  car- 
b n  atom am gwd moderatom. 
I). a chemie.lIy diltinct 
grouping of amm which can- 
not be furthcr broken down 
without cba~ging ib natuq, 
w, H& (water), GHsOH 
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